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ABSTRACT 
Since the end of the Cold War, most European states have begun to 
incorporate a broader understanding of security in their security documents and 
policies. As a result, security is understood in a more comprehensive way. This 
broader understanding of security includes, for example, issue-areas such as 
economics, human rights, and/or the environment. In this context, this study 
examines whether the adoption of the concept of a comprehensive security is 
leading to a convergence of the security cultures in Europe. This study examines, 
first, the concepts of comprehensive security and security culture. Then, using a 
method of structured, focused comparison, the guiding security policy documents 
and policies of Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland are examined with a 
focus on questions related to multilateralism and use of force. Analyzing these 
key factors and their implementation results in a better understanding of what the 
concept of comprehensive security implies for Europe and whether this may lead 
to a rapprochement of the different national security cultures. This study 
demonstrates that even though Europe still displays considerable heterogeneity 
as to diverse national understandings of security, one finds a tendency toward 
convergence, which leads to a growing European security culture.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has increasingly acted with more 
autonomy in security affairs. The deepening and widening of the European Union 
(EU) has additionally inspired widespread cooperation among its members. 
Moreover, through the crisis in its own backyard, in the Balkans, Europe has 
been forced to rethink its own security agenda. Finally, since the aftermath of the 
2001 terrorist attacks, and even more dramatically, with the wars on terror in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the relationship of Europe to its transatlantic ally, the United 
States, has undergone dramatic strains. However, security perceptions and 
policies differ significantly among the European countries, too. The varied 
reactions to the war in Iraq 2003 clearly demonstrate these diverging priorities. 
Consequently, one can observe different concepts of security among European 
countries.  
Due not only to the differences of opinion over Iraq, most European states 
have begun to incorporate a broader understanding of security in their security 
documents and policies. As a result, security is understood in a more 
comprehensive way. This thesis defines comprehensive security as an 
understanding of security that goes beyond the traditional realist state-centric 
and military approach. This broader understanding of security includes, for 
example, issue-areas such as economics, human rights, and/or the 
environment.1 Simultaneously, the concept of comprehensive security has 
become a widely discussed topic among academics. With the adoption of the 
idea of comprehensive security in European politics – on a national level as well 
as on an EU level – a process of convergence has taken place. The emergence 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1991 and the European 
                                            
1. David A. Baldwin, “The concept of security,” Review of International Studies 23 (1997): 5. 
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Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999 confirms this development. 
Moreover, Europe has grown together politically and economically: the 
enlargement of the EU to 27 members at the beginning of the year 2007 is a sign 
of this progress. This thesis will, therefore, argue that Europe is heading towards 
a security community. Such a security community can be defined as a 
“transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain 
dependable expectations of peaceful change.”2 Although CFSP and ESDP are 
still separate pillars of the EU, which is organized intergovernmentally, and the 
members of the EU might, therefore, still follow their own security agendas, there 
is a growing common understanding of security among the member states. 
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to study whether the adoption of 
the concept of comprehensive security is leading to a shared security culture in 
Europe. In this context, security culture consists of "cognitive, affective, and 
evaluative predispositions which shape foreign and security perceptions and 
policies of a collective entity.”3  
In this respect, it is crucial to mention that each security culture, on all 
levels, is heterogeneous. That is, elements of commonality as well as divergence 
occur. It is the amount of commonality that will determine whether there is a 
common security culture.  
This thesis will first explore the basic concepts of comprehensive security 
as well as security culture. Then, the guiding security policy documents of 
Germany, Great Britain, as well as Switzerland, will be examined with respect to 
                                            
2. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “A Framework for the study of security 
communities,”in Security Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnatt (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 30. 
3. John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and 
German Security Policy after Unification (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 25. See 
also: Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” International Security 19, no. 4 
(1995): 32-64; Peter J. Katzenstein, “Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World,” in The 
Culture of National Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Darryl 
Howlett, “Strategic Culture. Reviewing Recent Literature,” Strategic Insights 4, no. 10 (October 
2005), http://www.ccc.nps.navy. mil/si/2005 /Oct /howlettOct05.asp (accessed  February 
15,2007). 
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multilateralism and use of force. Analyzing these key factors and their 
implementation will result in a better understanding of what the concept of 
comprehensive security implies for Europe and whether this may lead to a 
rapprochement of the various national security cultures. 
The findings will highlight the importance of a common understanding of 
security and its implications for more agreed upon procedures in security affairs. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
A central security concern has been Europe's lack of effectiveness and 
cooperation regarding recent security challenges. For example, the conflicts in 
the Balkans in the 1990s disclosed the absence of a common understanding of 
security guiding European crisis management. In addition, disagreement about 
how to respond to the 2001 terrorist attacks showed, likewise, the absence of a 
common awareness of security. Regardless of new challenges such as terrorism 
or intrastate conflicts, the debate about the reorientation of security policies in 
Europe began slowly. However, current policy documents of individual European 
states as well as of the European Union, i.e. the European Security Strategy 
(ESS)4 of 2003, contain more and more elements of comprehensive security. 
Therefore, it is important to discern whether the adoption of such elements 
increases the level of commonality among the Europeans and allows one to 
speak of an emerging security culture.  
A common security culture of Europe, as a region, may also increase its 
reliability as an ally. The reactions on both sides of the Atlantic after the dispute 
over the 2003 war in Iraq were fierce in a way that had never before been seen 
within the transatlantic relations. However, within Europe itself, serious 
controversies have arisen because of varied responses to the war in Iraq. The 
European Security Strategy is the first common strategy document of the 
European Union. It includes many elements of the concept of comprehensive 
                                            
4. Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy (Brussels, 2003). 
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security. Because it is a document that comprises far more than the traditional 
dimensions of security, it is significant to examine whether the ESS signals a 
move towards a shared security culture.  
With the enlargement of the European Union, the edge of this security 
community approaches “zones of turmoil,”5 such as the Caucasus region or the 
Middle East, and this makes a common understanding of security more and more 
vital for Europe. In addition, the enlargement of the EU has led to the admission 
of states with vastly different political and historical backgrounds. A shared 
security culture would facilitate, therefore, a further integration of Europe.  
Furthermore, under the aegis of ESDP, the EU is currently performing 
seven different operations.6 These operations are based on a shared set of core 
goals. However, it is obvious that the more that a security culture is shared 
among the individual members of the EU, the broader the set of common goals 
and the simpler the process of deciding on what the new operations and their 
exact mission purposes will be. Consequently, ESDP operations might be more 
efficient, purposeful, and straightforward if guided by a shared security culture.  
Finally, a shared security culture matters because of the implication it has 
for the relations of the individual European countries among themselves. An 
emerging security culture will be able to strengthen the EU as a security 
community. Hence, conflicts between the members decrease, and the overall 
level of security in Europe increases. These developments may have significant 
effects for Europe as a regional power.  
 
                                            
5. Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zones of Peace / Zones of 
Turmoil (New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1993). 
6. In the western Balkans: EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea) 
and EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), in the Middle-East: EU Police Mission in 
the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing 
Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah), and the EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission 
for Iraq (Eujust Lex)) and in Africa: EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa), EU 
security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC DR Congo), and 
EU Support to AMIS II (Darfur).  
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a vast amount of literature about comprehensive security and 
security cultures. Although these ideas first emerged after the advent of security 
studies following World War II, the discussion deepened significantly after the 
end of the Cold War. The cessation of the bipolar world order, as well as 
globalization, has had a growing impact on these topics. There appears to be 
three main groups of literature dealing with the issue of this thesis.  
The first group surveys different concepts of security in general.7 This 
literature is primarily about establishing order in the area of security studies. 
Helga Haftendorn, for example, observes a broadening of the security definition 
from national security to international security to global security.8 David A. 
Baldwin acknowledges the concept of security to be “broad enough for use at 
any level.”9 Most of the authors, in particular the European ones, accept a wide 
definition of security. However, Stephen M. Walt, while recognizing a widening of 
the definition of security, insists that military threats to the national security are 
the most serious ones. In addition, there is a subgroup of literature, which deals 
mainly with security in Europe.10  
                                            
7. Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander (ed), Imperfect Unions. 
Security Institutions over Time and Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Baldwin, “The 
concept of security,” 5; Barry, Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A new 
Framework for Analysis ( Boulder/London: Lynne Riewer Publisher, 1998); Katzenstein, 
“Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World;” Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of 
Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly  35, no. 2 (June 1991): 211-239; Robert O. 
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Harvard: Harper Collins, 1989).    
8. Helga Haftendorn, “The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in 
International Security,” International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 1 (March 1991): 3-17. 
9. Baldwin, “The concept of security,” 24. 
10. Adrian Hyde-Price, “European Security in the twenty-first Century: Towards a Stable 
Peace Order?” in New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe, ed. Andrew Cottey and 
Derek Averre (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2002); Vladimir Handl, 
Kerry Longhurst, and Marcin Zaborowski, “German security policy towards Central Europe,” in 
New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe, ed. Andrew Cottey and Derek Averre 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2002); Andrew Cottey, East-Central 
Europe after the Cold War (London: Macmillan Press, 1995). 
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The second group of literature agrees to widen the security concept, but 
differs on which dimension to prioritize. Within this group, there is much literature 
about Environmental Security.11 While most of the authors try to establish the 
environment as a direct security threat or the source of a security threat, Nils 
Petter Gleditsch proposes to include military conflict itself as an environmental 
threat.12 Then, there is the literature about Human Security,13 a concept that 
focuses on the protection of human beings in a comprehensive manner. This 
concept of security has its roots in the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and 
was adopted by Canada and Japan.14 Finally, there is work about Societal 
Security, a concept that is closely linked to constructivism. The most important 
group of authors in this area is the Copenhagen School, a school of thought that 
stresses mainly identity, culture and knowledge rather than material issues.15  
The third group, which has recently materialized, consists of literature 
discussing whether there is, in fact, an emerging European Security Culture.16 
                                            
11. Nina Graeger, “Environmental Security?” Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (February 
1996): 109-116; Marc A. Levy, “Is the Environment a National Security Issue?” International 
Security 20, no. 2 (Autumn 1995): 35-62; Braden B. Allenby, “Environmental Security: Concept 
and Implementation,” International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science 
politique 21, no. 1 (January 2000): 5-21; Eric K. Stern, “Bringing the Environment In: The Case For 
Comprehensive Security,” Cooperation and Conflict 30 (1995): 211-237. 
12. Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature,” 
Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 3 (1998): 393. 
13. Roland Paris, “Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security 26, no. 
2 (Fall 2001): 87-102; Astrid Suhrke, “Human Security and the Interests of States,” Security 
Dialogue 30, no. 3 (September 1999): 265-276; Oliver Richmond, “Human Security, the 'Rule of 
Law,' and NGOs: Potentials and Problems for Humanitarian Intervention,” Human Rights Review 
2, no. 4 (July-September 2001).   
14. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994 (New York, 
Oxford University Press: 1994). 
15. Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 
16. Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the study of security communities,” 30; Emanuel 
Adler, “Europe's New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security Community,” in The Future of 
European Security, ed. Beverly Crawford (Berkley, UC Berkley: 1998); Paul Cornish and 
Geoffrey Edwards, “Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: the beginnings of a European strategic 
culture,” International Affairs 3 (2001): 587-604; Adrian Hyde-Price, “European Security, Strategic 
Culture, and the Use of Force,” in: Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security 
Agenda, ed. Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). 
Sten Rynning, “The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?" Security Dialog 34, no. 4 
(2003): 479-496. 
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The European Union is recognized as a vehicle that might forge a common 
culture because it has become “a political-institutional project.”17 However, in 
respect to a security community, the academic research has mainly focused on 
NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), not 
on the EU.18  
In sum, there is a plethora of literature on the different concepts of security 
and the tendency to identify Europe as a security community. However, the 
existing literature does not analyze how the concept of comprehensive security 
has been adopted by individual EU member states, nor does it analyze how this 
process is linked to the formation of a common security culture in Europe. In 
particular, a conspicuous gap remains in the area of reviewing and comparing 
security documents.  
The theoretical approach of Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett in 
analyzing the process of building a security community may be helpful. These 
authors take the following points as evidence for the emergence of a security 
community: multilateralism, unfortified borders, changes in military planning, 
common definition of the threat, and the discourse and language of community.19 
There is a major debate relevant for the topic, a debate regarding the 
existence or the growth of a European security culture. With the enlargement of 
the European Union as well as the division of Europe with respect to the war on 
terror in Iraq, there seem to be two main points of view regarding this subject.  
The first view is cautious in observing a common security culture in 
Europe and stresses diversity among the different countries in Europe. Adrian 
Hyde-Price and Vladimir Handl, for example, emphasize the different historical, 
                                            
17. Ole Waever, “Societal security: the concept,” in: Identity, Migration and the New Security 
Agenda in Europe, ed. Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1996): 79. 
18. Emanuel Adler, “Seeds of peaceful change: the OSCE's security community-building 
model,” in: Security Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnatt (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).      
19. Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the study of security communities,” 55-56.  
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geographical, and cultural backgrounds of the states.20 In addition, Andrew 
Cottey mentions the more “pragmatic view” of countries in East-Central Europe.21 
In other words, states in East-Central Europe seem to be still more influenced by 
ideas of power balancing than that of a shared collective identity in Western 
Europe. Likewise, Sten Rynning identifies differences among national security 
cultures.22 
The second view considers that Europe is on its way to a common 
security culture. Christoph O. Meyer argues that a convergence towards a 
European security culture progressively takes place through the mechanism of 
social learning.23 Furthermore, Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards identify steps 
to a European strategic culture in the light of the creation of the common 
European Security and Defense Policy.24  
Finally, the policy debates which revolve around the concept of 
comprehensive security concern not so much the concept itself but rather 
diverging priorities. For instance, multilateralism is strongly appreciated in most 
of the European security documents. However, preferences for partners or 
coalitions to work with vary strongly between states. A further example is 
terrorism, which is accepted as a leading threat to the security of a state or a 
community. Nevertheless, the priority of terrorism in the threat assessments 
diverges in the different security documents. 
 
                                            
20. Adrian Hyde-Price, “European Security in the Twenty-first Century: Towards a Stable 
Peace Order?” in New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe, ed. Andrew Cottey and 
Derek Averre (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2002), 139; Handl, 
Longhurst, and Zaborowski, “German security policy towards Central Europe,” 80.  
21. Cottey, East-Central Europe after the Cold War,157.  
22. Sten Rynning, “The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?"  
23. Christoph O. Meyer, “Convergence Toward a European Strategic Culture? A 
Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms,” European Journal of International 
Relations 11, no. 523 (2005): 524 
24. Cornish and Edwards, “Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The beginnings of a European 
strategic culture,” 587.  
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D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The major question to be answered in this thesis will be whether the 
concept of comprehensive security, embodied in most security documents of 
European countries in the last years, is helping to forge a shared security culture 
in Europe. While responding to this main research question, the thesis will also 
discuss the following sub-questions: Which dimensions of security are essential 
for the emergence of a common security culture? Is there a common security 
culture between Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland, diverse as they appear 
to be?  
This thesis will demonstrate that even though Europe still encounters 
considerable heterogeneity as to diverse national understandings of security, one 
observes a tendency toward convergence leading to a genuine European 
security culture.  
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis will focus first conceptualize the main analytical instruments, 
comprehensive security and security culture, and second evaluate the relevant 
security documents, based mainly on qualitative content analysis. In the 
conceptual part, the thesis will specify the independent variable (IV), the concept 
of a comprehensive security. It will then examine and attempt to determine which 
elements of security are decisive for the emergence of a common security 
culture. At the same time, the theoretical approach will also define the dependent 
variable (DV), the security culture itself. The sources regarding the conceptual 
approach are mainly secondary sources. The research is based on literature 
from European and American scholars.  
In the second part, Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland will act as 
case studies. Each case study contains a review of the development of 
comprehensive security approach in the respective country as well as an 
overview over its security culture. To make out the details of possible changes in 
 10
security culture since the end of the Cold War, this thesis will employ the method 
of a structured, focused comparison.25  In this connection, the following four 
questions, with respect to the timeframe from the end of the Cold War to the 
present, are asked: 
• What are the modifications regarding the use of force abroad? 
• What are the adjustments in preferences for multilateral versus 
bilateral approaches in the international system? 
• How has the relationship to multilateral security institutions 
developed? 
• What are the changes in democratic accountability for the use of force 
abroad? 
The adoption of the notion of comprehensive security is understood as a 
causal factor for possible changes. The sources in this main part of the thesis 
are, to the extent feasible, primary sources: security documents of the examined 
states. Secondary literature and a variety of opinion polls and newspaper 
interviews serve as additional sources.  
In the third part, based on the aforementioned questions, the adjustments 
and modifications in national security cultures of Germany, Great Britain, and 
Switzerland are compared. Thereby, eventual convergences of the national 
security cultures and thus a potential convergence toward a European security 
culture are examined. 
The cases are selected in view of a maximum of variance. The countries 
selected display different historical and political backgrounds. Germany is the 
pivotal power in Europe and its ideas about security policy have influenced other 
states significantly. Furthermore, after the reunification of 1989/1990, Germany 
experienced a dramatic change in its foreign policy while sending a larger 
                                            
25. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet. Case Studies and Theory Development in 
Social Sciences (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2005), 67-124. 
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number of troops abroad. However, Germany is also the country that still clings 
to the concept of soft power26 under a "policy of restraint" that is a consequence 
of the Nazi experience. Next, Great Britain is the closest ally of the United States 
in Europe and shares more common ground in security with its transatlantic 
partner than any other country in Europe. In addition, in contrast to Germany, 
Great Britain is taking part in the war on terror in Iraq. Finally, Switzerland is 
neither an EU nor a NATO member. However, Switzerland is, despite its 
neutrality, linked to European security. Contingents of the Swiss armed forces 
participate in operations of both organizations, the EU (in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) and NATO (in Kosovo). Moreover, in contrast to Germany and 
Great Britain, Switzerland was never member of a military alliance during the 
Cold War. 
 
                                            
26. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2004). 
 12
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 13
II. CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES 
A. CONCEPTS OF COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY 
1. Concepts of Security 
There are diverging views as to how far the concept of security should be 
widened. The various approaches are closely tied to three main schools in 
International Relations: realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism. The debate 
between these schools concerning security is the focal point of the discipline.  
First, the concept of security in realism is focused on the nation state and 
national interests. Moreover, as the survival of the state is pivotal, security and 
defense policies and military means are crucial.27 Whereas defensive realists, 
such as Kenneth N. Waltz, concentrate on security,28 offensive realists, such as 
John J. Mearsheimer, see states as power maximizers.29 Indeed, military 
capabilities are at the center of both. Likewise, neorealists, such as Stephen M. 
Walt, acknowledge security in this narrow realm of the nation state.30  This 
concept of security, so called national security, was the predominant scholarly 
view until the 1980s. 
Second, neoliberal theories of International Relations allow a broader and 
wider understanding of security. Primarily, neoliberal institutionalists challenged 
realism and its idea of national security with the notion of complex 
interdependence, derived foremost from the rising importance and worldwide 
                                            
27. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, rev. 
Kenneth W. Thomsen (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 27. 
28. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Studies (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 
29. John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” 
International Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5-57.  
30. Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International 
Security  9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 3-43. 
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interconnectedness of the economy.31  In particular, institutionalists stress the 
security relevance of international cooperation and institutions.32 Their view of 
international relations is, consequently, more benign than the rather pessimistic 
realist view, despite sharing the same starting assumptions of anarchy and self-
help and seeing states as rational utility maximizers. 
Third, the constructivist school believes that security itself is socially 
constructed, along with interests, threats, and capabilities.33 This implies that 
perceptions of security vary among actors and across time and space. Moreover, 
shared knowledge in a social structure, such as a security community or a state, 
might be the result of socialization and thus a collective learning process.34 
Based on these observations, Helga Haftendorn distinguishes between 
three different concepts of security, which span from “national security” to 
“international security” to “global security.” These concepts of security are based 
on the recognition of fundamental transformations of the international system: 
Each concept of security corresponds to specific values, threats, 
and capabilities to meet the perceived challenges. Its historical 
evolution is linked to the extension of the boundaries of the 
international system, from one of regionally bounded nation-states, 
to the highly interdependent political systems of the industrialized 
world, to a global community of people.35 
In this context, Haftendorn links the different concepts of security to those 
philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries who are also the main reference 
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points for the three theories mentioned. She traces national security back to 
Thomas Hobbes, international security to Hugo De Grotius and global security to 
Immanuel Kant: 
At first glance, the paradigm of national security responds to 
political realism as taught by Hobbes, while the paradigm of global 
security follows the Kantian tradition, with its assumption of a 
community of mankind and political processes controlled by 
enlightened men. The paradigm of international security, in turn, 
becomes meaningful with the formation of security regimes and the 
building of international institutions as Grotius has recommended.36  
Haftendorn's thinking in the categories of national security, international 
security and global security is mainly about the question of whether the security 
of one state can be guaranteed by itself or whether it has to be manifest in 
relation to other states.  
A further approach to the study of international security is offered by Victor 
D. Cha who argues that globalization is the significant element which influences 
current thinking about security.37 In his view, the influence of globalization has 
been neglected because of the debate over security between the different 
schools of thought in international relations. 
…non-physical security, diversification of threats, and the salience 
of identity are key effects of globalization in the security realm. 
These security effects translate into certain behavioral tendencies 
in a state's foreign policy that have thus far not been studied in the 
literature.38 
Cha identifies three main effects on security. First, he states, the 
delimitation of internal and external security has become blurred. Second, the 
level of bureaucracy is forced to be innovative in security issues; therefore,  
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38. Ibid., 391.  
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cooperation with partners which are not on the state level achieves an extension 
of meaning. And third, ordinary ways of fighting as well as thinking strategically 
have to be reconsidered.39 
2. Broadening and Deepening the Concept of Security 
Besides different concepts of security, which are linked to theories of 
International Relations, there are additional concepts which seek to define the 
security environment. Both the concepts of security which are attributed to a 
school of thought in International Relations, as well as the previously mentioned 
thematic concepts, go beyond the narrow realist approach to security. As a 
result, they either refer to a new level of analysis or add a new dimension to 
security. 
First, Human Security is a concept which covers the protection of human 
beings in a comprehensive manner. It is in its consequence the continuation of 
Helga Haftendorn's thoughts about global security.40  Consequently, in contrast 
to realist security concepts, the level of analysis is in this case the individual. 
Sven Biscop states, 
Human Security takes the individual and his community as point of 
reference, rather than the state, by addressing both military and 
non-military threats to his/her security. The security of the state is 
seen not as an end in itself, but as a means of - and necessary 
precondition for - providing security for people.41 
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The roots of the concept are to be found in a United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) document of 1994.42 Roland Paris lists elements of this 
concept and mentions “economic, food, health, environmental, personal, 
community, and political”43 security.  
Obviously, human security concerns all elements of a man's life. It has 
therefore to be understood as the basic philosophy of this UN Programme and 
not as a claim to be directly and fully applied. In other words, the concept of 
human security, as reflected in this UN Programme, may be perceived as 
general  guidelines and not as a closed and finalized concept. However, there 
are authors who have tried to narrow the understanding of human security in a 
way that can be used, for example, to limit it to “threats to safety and freedom.”44 
Canada, for instance, has adopted the concept of human security by highlighting 
five policy priorities: protection of civilians, peace support operations, conflict 
prevention, governance and accountability, and public safety.45 
A second concept is Environmental Security which seeks to include the 
dimension of environmental degradation into the concept of national security. In 
this context, “environment” is mostliy defined as a “physical and biological 
system,”46 to clearly distinguish it from areas such as politics, economics or 
societal issues. However, proponents of the concept of environmental security 
often stress the interaction of political, economic, and environmental matters as 
well as their combined influence on security.47 Incidentally, Nina Graeger 
mentions four reasons to link environmental issues and security:  
First, environmental degradation is in itself a severe threat to 
human security and all life on earth….Second, environmental 
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degradation or change can be both cause or consequence of 
violent conflict.…Third, predictability and control are essential 
elements of military security considerations, and these are also 
important elements in the safeguarding of the 
environment….Finally, a cognitive linkage between the environment 
and security has been established.48 
Furthermore, Marc A. Levy highlights two categories of security risks 
caused by environmental degradation. On the one side, the so called “direct 
security risks,” which have a direct effect on national security, such as climate 
change, with the result of large-scale economic disruption; on the other side, 
“indirect security risks” that affect national security in a rather implied way 
through political change beyond the concerned state.49 
Finally, Societal Security is a concept that is closely linked to 
constructivism. This concept has mainly been developed by the so called 
“Copenhagen School” around Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. The pivotal points in 
this concept are collective identities of societies which share a common “we–
feeling”.50 In other words, societal security is “about large, self-sustaining identity 
groups.”51 Consequently, it is not necessarily the state, which is in the focus, but 
a group of people who share a common identity. Buzan explains society in this 
context as follows: 
Society is about identity, the self-conception of communities and of 
individuals identifying themselves as members of a community. 
These identities are distinct from, although often entangled with, the 
explicitly political organizations concerned with government.52  
Buzan identifies three main threats to societal security: Migration, the 
overriding influence from a neighboring society or a neighboring collective 
(horizontal competition), and integrating as well as secessionist projects (vertical 
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competition).53 The main critiques of the concept of societal security have come 
again from the realist school of thought, because no longer is the state, and with 
it sovereignty, in the center, but rather the identity of a group.54  
Although broad support has yet to be found for these thematical concepts 
of environmental security, two main criticisms can be discovered. A first line of 
disapproval, mainly presented by structual realists, disagrees with the 
broadening of the security concept at all. Walt, for example, asserts: “Defining 
the field in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more 
difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems.”55 Another critic 
argues against a securitization of the environment, questions of human topics, or 
societal issues, because the quality of a "security issue" implies the “claim to 
handle something with less democratic control and constraint.”56  
3. A Comprehensive Approach to Security 
In this thesis, comprehensive security is conceptualized as an approach 
towards security issues which is broader than the traditional realist concept and 
includes the aforementioned dimensions. In other words, security is recognized 
as a subject that goes beyond the traditional realist state-centric and military 
approach. The term "comprehensive security" was coined in political and 
academic circles in Western Europe during the 1980s. Both, the academics as 
well as the policymakers, were seeking an approach to security which was 
broader and deeper than the realist notion of security.57 However, already in  
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1973, the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), took a 
comprehensive view on security, though the approach was named cooperative 
security.58 
One can observe mainly three categories which the broadening and 
widening of the concept of security affects. A first dimension refers to the 
question of whose security should be guaranteed. In other words, who else, 
besides the state, may benefit from security - is it just a state or are also groups 
or even individuals included? Haftendorn argues that security “should be 
multifocused, not limited to a single issue-area or level of analysis.”59 Likewise, 
Baldwin perceives the need for the application of security to many levels of 
analysis: “Individual, family, society, state, international system, or humanity.”60 A 
second category concerns the sources of threat. That is, which sources, besides 
the realist military threat, have to be comprised in a security concept? Keith 
Krause and Michael C. Williams argue that such a comprehensive approach to 
security should "include a wider range of potential threats, ranging from 
economic and environmental issues to human rights and migration."61 Moreover, 
Adler stresses the link among these different issues.62 Finally, a third heading 
relates to the different tools which may be used to face the threats. Therefore, a 
broader and deeper understanding of security might include, above all, elements 
such as diplomacy, economics, or human rights. In this context, Baldwin 
concludes that "like wealth, the goal of security can be pursued by a wide variety 
of means.”63 
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B. SECURITY CULTURES 
1. The Nature of Security Cultures 
The concept of security in realism is focused on the nation state and 
national interests. Moreover, as the survival of the state is pivotal, security and 
defense policies and military means are crucial.64 In this context, Alastair Iain 
Johnston points out that the realist school of thought takes for granted that states 
are “undifferentiated units that seek to optimize their utility.”  
However, supporters of a cultural security approach are convinced that 
“decision-makers in different societies do indeed think and act differently from 
one another when faced with similar strategic circumstances and choices."65 In 
other words, there are further motivations which causally affect the formulation of 
security policies and which go far beyond material capabilities. These impulses 
are rooted in the particular security culture of a state or a society.  
Ideas of security culture appeared for the first time in the 1940s and 
1950s. They attempted to link culture and the behavior of states. A nation’s 
culture was chiefly characterized by “language, religion, customs, socialization, 
and the interpretation of common memories.”66 A second generation of academic 
works appeared in the late 1970s. It was Jack Snyder who analyzed Soviet 
military strategy based on cultural considerations.67 The domestic conditions 
which lead to a distinctive security culture were the focus of this generation of 
scholars.68 Finally, a third generation, strongly influenced by constructivism, 
appeared in the 1990s. The scholars of the constructivist paradigm took studies 
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of security culture into consideration and sought to include “a sociological 
perspective on the politics of national security.”69 Proponents of the constructivist 
approach tried to challenge the shortcomings of realist explanations by taking 
into account ideas about security culture.  
The literature views a security culture as only one of several different 
cultures that influence decision making. Amongst others, the literature concerns 
political cultures, security cultures, strategic cultures, and military cultures. There 
are two ways to bring order in the different forms of culture and hence to isolate 
the one focus, security culture. First, security cultures can be recognized as the 
intersection of political, strategic, and diplomatic cultures. Taking this intersection 
into account, Krause defines security cultures as  
enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes, and 
symbols that inform the ways in which a state's / society's interests 
and values, with respect to security, stability, and peace are 
perceived, articulated, and advanced.70  
A second view identifies security culture as one component of a 
hierarchical order. That is, security culture is to be viewed in a broader way than 
military culture, but in a narrower sense than political culture.  
Obviously, a strict delimitation of the different cultures is not possible and 
not practicable. Therefore, as a working definition of security culture we might 
utilize John S. Duffield’s definition: 
A security culture consists of cognitive, affective, and evaluative 
predispositions which shape foreign and security perceptions and 
policies of a collective entity.71  
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As a result, because security culture comprises cognitive, affective, and 
evaluative components, it goes beyond pure belief systems or ideologies.72  
2. Characteristics of Security Cultures  
Beginning with Duffield's explanation of political culture, three significant 
characteristics can be discovered: Political cultures are a property of a collective; 
they are, in principle, distinctive; and they are highly stable.73 These 
characteristics are valid for security culture as well, as they do not refer directly to 
a certain level, but rather, more generally, to all cultures in security affairs.  
The first characteristic is that security culture is a property of a collective. 
In other words, security culture is not based on individual members of a 
collective, but on shared understandings among the majority of the people who 
make up the collective. This characteristic has consequences in issues such as 
the ability to change the security culture, the capacity to “implement” a security 
culture, and also the relation between the collective and the individual. In this 
context, the question becomes: What kind of collective may share a common 
security culture? Whereas a security culture for a state is widely accepted, many 
scholars also acknowledge a security culture amongst a collectivity of several 
states.74 In other words, when states build a security community with “shared 
identities, values, and meanings,”75 a common security culture may arise. 
Particularly important for this thesis, the EU is recognized as a vehicle that might 
forge a common culture because it has become “a political-institutional project.”76 
Thus, security cultures can also form on a regional level. 
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The second characteristic of a security culture is its distinctiveness. This 
feature refers to the critique of the realist view that states are black boxes whose 
actions are based on objective, material interests. Therefore, although states find 
themselves in similar situations, they react differently because of their different 
security cultures.  
Finally, the third characteristic, and probably the most discussed, is that 
security cultures are highly stable. Indeed, Duffield stresses the comparison with 
material conditions.77 Most of the literature, though, admits that change is 
possible. In this context, authors stress two different modes which might cause 
change. The first mode of change is a slow one, mostly through socialization. 
Harry Eckstein uses the tools of socialization and internalization to explain 
different cultures in general.78 Besides this internalization, a further process can 
fall under these categories, a learning process, including learning through 
failure.79 Among the case studies of this paper, Great Britain has faced such a 
challenge with the failure of the appeasement politics at the advent of World War 
II. The second mode of change is a fast and abrupt one. That is, security culture 
can change dramatically because of “dramatic events or traumatic 
experiences.”80 Germany is the example of a state that went through such 
dramatic events and traumatic experiences in the time of the Nazis in World War 
II. Consequently, the security culture of Germany changed significantly after the 
end of World War II. 
In sum, security culture implies that states act differently despite the fact 
that they are in similar situations. Hence, the studies of security culture might 
help scholars as well as policy makers in several respects. The first rationale for 
looking at security cultures is the ability to explain puzzles, in particular where 
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realists are not able to explain a certain outcome. As mentioned previously, this 
motive was one of the reasons that “the ideas of security culture gained 
increased relevance after the end of the Cold War.”81  
A close analysis of security cultures helps policy makers deal with other 
states in a more and more globalizing and thus interconnected world, where 
intercultural knowledge and sensitivity counts. From a historical point of view, in 
most cases scholars concentrated on “knowing the enemy.” However, in current 
security policies, there is often no clearly identifiable enemy. Moreover, the 
knowledge about security cultures becomes more and more relevant for third 
party interventions, for instance in diplomatic negotiations, in mediation attempts, 
in peacekeeping missions, or in cases of stabilization and reconstruction. In this 
respect, security culture is about avoiding misunderstandings and misperceptions 
and thus improving policy output. Hence, it is not only about “knowing the 
enemy,” but also, rather, “knowing the belligerents” or even “knowing the friends.” 
3. Factors Shaping Security Cultures  
There are, in principle, two diverse factors which might account for 
different security cultures: material and ideational factors. The several sources 
that shape security culture often include both factors.82 The subsequent 
categories outline mainly what Darryl Howlett highlights.83 
The first source of security culture is the history and experience of a state 
and nation. In this context, changes of security culture-- because of formative 
events such as shocks as well as the slower mode of learning-- play a 
noteworthy role. That is, history can be understood as all of the events a state 
has experienced. When dealing with history, one has to decide when the 
historical starting point should be for identifying the roots of a security culture.84 
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For example, using World War II as a reference point, the states in Europe have 
been able to experience a prosperous and secure environment as never before. 
Conversely, choosing the end of the Cold War as a starting point leads to a 
completely different perception of the situation today and might influence the 
current security culture in Europe. 
The second group of sources refers to the internal political system of a 
state. It concerns, in an overarching respect, the form of the state and its 
organization. In other words, security culture is dependent on whether a state is a 
liberal-democracy, an authoritarian state, or a developing country. Moreover, this 
group of sources is highly interdependent with history and experience. That is, 
the length of time in which a state has undergone a certain form of state 
significantly shapes its security culture. In addition, Howlett mentions the 
character of a state as “pluralist or dominated by narrow elites.” Features in this 
group are the organization of the armed forces – for example whether it is 
organized of professionals or a conscript system – the security administration, as 
well as the weight of public opinion.85 
A third group of sources covers geography, which impacts also on the 
regional balance of power. Howlett mentions the proximity to great powers as 
one of the most important factors.86 In this respect, the geostrategic position, for 
example, of Germany, has been crucial for the evolution of its security culture. 
Furthermore, resources lastingly shape the security culture of a state because 
possession or not of resources might affect how dependent a state is. Similarly, 
the size of a state itself influences its security culture, since the freedom to 
maneuver is limited without a certain size and/or resources. In such cases, the 
tendency to cooperate may be more pronounced.  
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Finally, a last group of sources influences a security culture from outside 
of a state.87 This is mainly about the involvement of a state in institutions. 
Following the ideas of the constructivist school of thought, institutions are more 
than just rational actors and are capable of developing a unique organizational 
culture.88 Generally, constructivists believe that ideas have a significant influence 
inside an institution. Permanent interaction between members of an institution 
shapes their perceptions and beliefs. Therefore, institutions could be the vehicle 
by which a state's security culture is developed, changed, or at least influenced. 
Constructivists also stress the importance of learning inside an institution. Such a 
social learning process influences means (simple learning) or even ends 
(complex learning).89 This indicates that inside an institution a collective 
understanding of security culture might grow. A further consequence of the 
constructivist school of thought affects the diffusion of norms through an 
institution. In other words, the spillover of ideas and norms concerning security 
issues helps to foster a common security culture.  
Although the sources of a security culture were catalogued in this chapter, 
they should not be viewed as isolated but as interdependent. Hence, the security 
culture of a state is the result of a unique combination of all of these different 
sources. In addition, myths and symbols have an influence, too, and contribute to 
the previously mentioned distinctiveness of a security culture. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This paper treats comprehensive security as a concept that goes beyond 
the narrow realist state-centric approach. In other words, all of the different 
theories, concepts, and models, which broaden and widen the notion of security, 
might be part of a comprehensive understanding of security. Still, security culture 
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implies that states act differently despite the fact that they are in similar 
situations. Hence, both the concept of comprehensive security as well as the 
idea of security culture challenge realism. 
Haftendorn stresses the connection between the concept of security and 
the different cultures in the security area by stating that “regional variations of 
security concepts can be explained by different national priorities and the 
resulting security strategies, which are in part culturally and geopolitically 
determined.”90 
This indicates a link between the concepts of comprehensive security and 
security cultures. According to Haftendorn, the adoption of a specific security 
concept is, among other reasons, motivated by a distinctive security culture. 
Security concepts are thus causally linked to security cultures. Diverging security 
concepts might point to diverging security cultures, and a congruence of security 
concepts might point to close security cultures. Conversely, the causal effect 
between comprehensive security and security culture may also be observed in 
the other direction, that is, from a common concept of comprehensive security to 
a shared security culture. The adoption of the concept of comprehensive security 
by many Europeans might thus document, as well as stimulate, a progressive 
convergence of national security cultures and the emergence of a regional 
security culture in recent years.  
This thesis proceeds generally on the assumption that there is reciprocal 
interaction between comprehensive security and security culture. However, in 
particular, the thesis seeks to explain adjustments and modifications in security 
cultures through the adoption of the notion of comprehensive security. In other 
words, it is about the effect of a wider and broader understanding of security 
(comprehensive security) on security culture. The thesis will examine this effect 
on three different national security concepts: the ones from Germany, Great 
Britain, and Switzerland. The acceptance of comprehensive security will be 
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especially based on the development of the White Papers of the examined 
countries. The idea of comprehensive security comprises elements and 
dimensions that are the same for all states in Europe. For example, 
environmental problems or migration do not stop at state borders. Intra-state 
conflicts may cause similar problems everywhere in Europe. In contrast, because 
there was mainly a narrow focus on security during the Cold War, security 
cultures could not be influenced by a common approach of comprehensive 
security. 
This thesis seeks to locate changes in security culture in regard to two 
significant elements: perceptions of multilateralism and the use of force. States 
differ significantly concerning their dedication to international cooperation and 
their willingness to use force in international relations. Both components are 
significantly influenced by diverging security cultures. Multilateralism is close to a 
comprehensive approach to security. The cooperative thrust of multilateralism 
goes beyond the realist notion of strict self-help. How a state interacts with others 
as well as how a state is integrated in formal or informal institutions, in other 
words its level of multilateralism, says a lot about its security culture.  
The use of force, as it is understood in this thesis, includes two different 
facets. On the one hand, the use of force addresses the question of who or which 
actor is competent to set out force at all. On the other hand, the use of force 
concerns the issue of which kind of force is exercised. These may be not only 
military means, but also economic, diplomatic or other non violent coercive 
measures. These measures are the result of a comprehensive understanding of 
security. Alternatively, the different options and the timing for the use of force are 
indeed also part of the security culture of a state. Perceptions of multilateralism 
and use of force are, in fact, closely linked. That is, when involved in security 
institutions, questions as to who may sanction order and which kind of force is 
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III. COMPARISON OF NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTS 
This chapter presents case studies of Germany, Great Britain, and 
Switzerland, respectively. Each case study is divided in two main parts. The first 
section investigates the comprehensive security approach of the country in 
question while the second deals with its security culture. The next chapter 
compares the cases and draws conclusions. 
A. GERMANY 
The first half of this case study examines, first, Germany’s advancement 
regarding the adoption of comprehensive security in its security documents since 
the end of the Cold War. Then, in the subsequent part of this first section, the 
issues of multilateralism and the use of force in the current White Paper of 2006 
are evaluated. Second, after a brief overview of Germany’s security culture, 
again in particular concerning multilateralism and the use of force, four main 
modifications since 1989/1990 will be addressed. In this context, the emergence 
of the idea of comprehensive security will offer a possible explanation for these 
adjustments in Germany’s security culture.  
1. Comprehensive Security 
a.  Overview 1989 - 2006 
In Germany, the events of 1989 and 1990 facilitated a transition to 
a comprehensive approach to security. After the end of the Cold War and 
reunification of the divided country, security policy changed from a one-
dimensional focus on the overwhelming military Soviet threat to a more 
multidimensional focus, which also incorporated the ideas of regional and global 
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security.91 Even in the 1970s, the first approaches to a broader understanding of 
security in Germany's security policy could be observed. Based on ideas in 
academic literature, the concept of security was, above all, broadened in regard 
to economic security.92 The White Paper of 1975/1976, although keeping a 
strong focal point on military security, attempted to include economic aspects.93 
The Social Democrats pursued in the 1980s the concept of 
“cooperative security,” which aimed at reducing tensions across the East-West 
divide and acting on common interests such as the prevention of a nuclear war. 
Several commonly signed papers with the East German SED (Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands - Socialistic Unity Party of Germany) were a 
controversial result of this security concept that deliberately sought to distance 
itself from what it perceived as an antagonistic East-West confrontational “logic.” 
With Gorbachev’s accession to power in the Soviet Union in 1985 and his 
overtures based on “new thinking,” those cooperative vectors gained more 
ground and Germany became a forerunner of disarmament and détente in the 
Alliance, even to the point of risking open confrontation with the U.S. on the 
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and Short Range Nuclear Forces 
(SNF) “zero options.”  
Given this receptivity for alternative notions of security, the events 
of 1989 triggered an enhanced notion of security in Germany. At the end of 1989, 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, speaking about the future of NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact, used the expression “comprehensive security.”94 The Bundeswehr for the 
first time began to operate “out of area” (i.e. NATO territory). Engagement of  
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minesweepers after the Gulf War in 1991 and participation in the UN missions in 
Cambodia as well as in Somalia were initial consequences of this extended 
understanding of security.95  
Consequently, these ideas of a wider understanding of security 
were also incorporated in the German White Paper of 1994.96 The approach of 
the 1994 White Paper actually went beyond a narrow realist view of security, 
stating in the conclusion that “in the future strategic environment, military risk will 
only be part of a wide spectrum of variables influencing security policy.”97 
Although in public speeches, the preponderance seemed still to lay on the 
economic broadening of the security, the White Paper of 1994 revealed clearly a 
broadening also in a social and environmental respect, including the 
institutionalist notion of interdependence: 
Risk analysis of future developments must be based on a broad 
concept of security. They must not be confined to Europe, but must 
consider the interdependence of regional and global developments. 
They must include social and ecological trends and view them in 
relation to the security of Germany and its allies. In the future, it will 
be essential to take account of all factors in a comprehensive 
assessment of the political and strategic situation.98  
Moreover, German politicians stressed the humanitarian dimension 
of security as well. For instance, Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping highlighted 
in 1998 the fight against underdevelopment and for democracy and human rights 
as part of the German approach to security.99 His motivation to contribute 
German forces to operation Allied Force in Kosovo a year later stemmed very 
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much from a moral impetus to prevent a “humanitarian catastrophe.” The 
experience of the Bosnian war had strengthened this humanitarian impulse of 
German security policy considerably. Two years later, Scharping even stressed 
that cultural elements might be integrated into the understanding of 
comprehensive security.100  
Generally, in the 1990s, the idea of comprehensive security 
became more and more a hallmark of the German security policy. The 
interventions in Croatia and Bosnia as well as in Kosovo spurred this 
reorientation, with repercussions also on the practical side of Germany's security 
policy. In both cases, Germany’s interventions were made in cooperation with its 
allies, which corroborate  Germany’s cooperative approach towards security 
since its integration into NATO and EU in the 1950s, signaling Germany’s 
dedication to multilateralism. Moreover, the reasons for the distinctive decisions 
were driven not only by military considerations but rather humanitarian ones. In 
this context, the large number of refugees and the financial and social burdens 
they posed highlighted the risks of intra-state, ethnic wars escalating horizontally, 
affecting not only regional stability but even the well-being of a seemingly far-
away country like Germany. Finally, Germany (due to its traditional restraint in 
employing military force) placed special emphasis on non-military means to 
tackle the crises, focusing specifically on diplomatic mediation as well as 
economic sanctions and incentives.  
This development towards a broader understanding of security 
resonated in the new Defense Policy Guidelines 2003.101 In contrast to the White 
Papers, which are issued by the Defense Ministry, but need to be approved by 
the cabinet which is traditionally composed of several coalition partners, the 
Defense Policy Guidelines are the responsibility of the Federal Minister of 
Defense alone. In these Policy Guidelines 2003, the comprehensive approach 
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takes a prominent position. The drafter of these Guidelines, under the influence 
of the terrorist attacks of 2001, laid emphasis especially on a more detailed threat 
assessment. In addition, the military was now portrayed as one of the means to 
counter the new challenges, as the Gudelines stated that  
…the political will and ability to enforce or restore freedom and 
human rights, stability and security with military means, if 
necessary, are a sine qua non of a credible comprehensive 
approach to security policy. 102 
To stress that military means are also a part of the extended 
comprehensive definition of security was a reaction to the rather strong pacifist 
strand of German politics which tended to neglect this dimension of security and 
talked about a militarization of German foreign policy because of the increasing 
willingness of the government to deploy the Bundeswehr in UN and NATO 
missions.103 In other words, the Defense Policy Guidelines 2003 explicitly 
included the military as one of the main instruments of security policy – a fact that 
might be self-evident in other countries but was controversial in some parts of 
German society and politics. 
Finally, the German White Paper, issued in the fall of 2006, reflects 
the current German approach towards comprehensive security.104 Not 
surprisingly, White Paper 2006 does not change course regarding Germany's 
concept of security. Instead, this paper consolidates the development of the 
notion of comprehensive security in Germany. The White Paper refers to the 
Defense Policy Guidelines of 2003 as well as to the European Security Strategy 
(ESS)105 of the same year. Furthermore, White Paper 2006 adds a wider political 
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frame and is therefore a fortiori, an inclusive security policy document, which 
represents the “agreed version of a comprehensive national security concept.”106  
White Paper 2006, itself, declares that “German security policy is 
based on a comprehensive concept of security.”107 Moreover, the concept is 
explained in detail, starting from a premise that 
…the radical changes in the security environment have created 
new risks and threats that are not only having a destabilizing effect 
on Germany's immediate surroundings but also impact on the 
security of the international community as a whole. A successful 
response to these new challenges requires the application of a 
wide range of foreign, security, defence, and development policy 
instruments in order to identify, prevent, and resolve conflicts at an 
early stage.108 
This explanation of Germany's approach towards security may 
serve as a concept that goes beyond the traditional realist view of security. This 
statement in the White Paper demonstrates Germany's comprehensive concept 
of security. First, by mentioning the international community, the general concept 
corresponds with Haftendorn's notion of international security. Second, the new 
threat environment is addressed. Furthermore, globalization, terrorism, 
proliferation, regional conflicts, illegal arms trade, obstacles to development and 
fragile statehood, energy security, migration, as well as epidemics and 
pandemics are listed as challenges and risks.109 The new element of energy 
security was especially controversial in the German debate surrounding the 
concept. Finally, the potential instruments to respond to the threats and 
challenges are not limited to military means, but also include soft instruments.  
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Besides the broadening of the concept of security in the previously 
mentioned respects, White Paper 2006 includes components of human, 
environmental and societal security as well. Regarding human security, White 
Paper 2006 stresses, for example, poor education, diseases, inequality, or 
human rights violations as indirect sources for conflicts110 and, hence, as threats 
to Germany's security. Also, the document states explicitly that Germany is 
willing to provide security for its citizens.111 In addition, contributions to human 
rights and sustained development are mentioned. These are all clear references 
to an understanding of security, not only on a state level, but also for individual 
human beings. Subsequently, White Paper 2006 takes environmental concerns 
into account as well: natural disasters and environmental destruction are 
perceived as possible roots for conflicts.112 Finally, by highlighting the 
responsibility of institutions and elucidating the building of a security community, 
above all, among European countries, the societal aspect of security entered 
White Paper 2006.  
Not only has White Paper 2006 itself stressed the far reaching 
approach to security as one of the main pillars of Germany's security concept, 
but also politicians mention this approach while speaking about Germany's 
security policy. However, politicians sometimes underline different aspects of the 
comprehensive approach. For example, Chancellor Angela Merkel pointed out 
the comprehensive approach after the release of White Paper 2006, stressing 
the facet of international security.113 In contrast, Heidi Wegener, a member of the 
German Parliament, highlighted in addition to this international part, societal and 
human characteristics of Germany's security policy.114 Accordingly, the 
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characteristics of Germany's comprehensive approach to security allow for 
variation in accent. However, in Germany's concept of comprehensive security, 
multilateralism and the question of use of force hold prominent positions. 
b. Multilateralism and the Use of Force  
Particular emphasis in White Paper 2006 is given to “the 
multilateral orientation of German foreign and security policy."115 The security 
document dedicates the whole second chapter to German security policy in the 
international environment, reflecting the strong multilateralist tradition that feeds 
German foreign and security policy, as it was deliberately designed in the 1950s 
by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. That chapter reviews the most significant 
security institutions in which Germany is engaged. Indeed, “a comprehensive 
security strategy operates through dialogue, cooperation, partnership and 
institutionalized, rule-based multilateralism.”116 In contrast to earlier documents, 
the prominence that is accorded to the European Union (EU) and its strategy is 
evidence of this advance. In this context, it is important to discern that White 
Paper 2006 stresses, unequivocally, Europe's character as a community.117 
Nevertheless, the chapter on security institutions is headed by NATO. NATO 
itself, organized before 1989 mainly as a collective defense alliance, has been 
influenced by the comprehensive approach as well and is perceived as an 
institution which is employed not only in strict military operations but also in 
preventive diplomacy or peacekeeping missions.118 Although listed after NATO 
and the EU, the United Nations (UN) plays a pivotal role in Germany's 
cooperative security structure. The UN should be able to accomplish its tasks 
and its missions. It is hardly by accident that the White Paper chose the same 
slogan of “effective multilateralism”119 that is upheld in the ESS.120  
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At the same time, the mentioning of the UN is a link to a whole 
array of questions concerning the authority which is competent to allow the use 
of force. Germany stresses the importance of the UN, stressing the need for a 
functioning and enforceable international system, because according to the 
White Paper all use of force should be authorized by the UN or a regional 
security organization which is formally recognized by the UN.121 This requirement 
is a result of the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 
confirming not only that the deployment of German soldiers abroad generally 
conforms to the Basic Law but that this deployment should always be based on a 
Security Council mandate.122 The UN focus has a further implication as concerns 
the use of force, namely the choice of instruments used to enforce UN policies 
and sanctions. As the UN Charter encourages members to employ tools other 
than military force in international relations, the prominent place of the UN in 
White Paper 2006 emphasizes Germany's need to provide a set of non-military 
tools to resolve conflicts.123 White Paper 2006 argues that 
German security policy is based on a comprehensive concept of 
security. Risks and threats have to be addressed with a suitably 
matched range of instruments. These include diplomatic, economic, 
development policy and policing measures as well as military 
means and, where called for, also armed operations.124 
This passage reveals three important points about Germany's 
attitude towards the use of force. First, to tackle risks and threats, different 
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instruments are mentioned. Obviously, not relying solely or even primarily on 
military means is one of the main characteristics of a comprehensive approach. 
In particular, the complementarity of civilian and military components was 
stressed when Security Paper 2006 was released. Chancellor Merkel remarked 
on this fact while calling for a “unified approach.”125 The focus is on civilian 
measures. The importance of instruments of the civilian side can also be seen in 
the “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace 
Building”126 concept of Germany. This concept seeks to combine the diverse 
civilian instruments in synergy.  Second, military means and armed operations 
are listed separately. Hence, this stands for additional tasks for the military 
besides armed operations. Third, armed operations have to be called for by the 
UN or a recognized regional security organization. 
In sum, beginning in the 1970s, and accelerating after the end of 
the cold war, Germany deliberately began adopting traits of comprehensive 
security in its policy papers as well as in policy implementation. Besides a strong 
accent on international security, at the beginning, emphasis was laid on an 
extension to the economic part of security. Soon after, further endorsements in 
environmental, societal, and human security came into contemplation. Therefore, 
in the next section, changes in the security culture after 1989, in particular 
regarding multilateralism and the use of force, are surveyed and the possible 
roots in the comprehensive approach examined. 
2. Security Culture  
a. Overview 
Germany's current security culture has to be traced back to the end 
of World War II. After the traumatic past of the totalitarian Nazi regime with its 
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strong unilateral and militaristic approach towards security, the character of 
Germany's security culture became mainly self restraining and moderate. This 
“policy of restraint,” as it was later called by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, combined with a strong commitment to international institutions, 
became the hallmark of Germany's foreign and security policy. Subsequent to the 
end of the Cold War and reunification, Germany's security culture has maintained 
to a greater or lesser extent those main features. That is, the foreign and security 
policy of Germany is marked by continuity at a high rate, although many feared a 
fundamental reorientation after the end of the Cold War.127 However, some 
notable changes did take place. In other words, “the political leadership in 
government and in the main opposition party supported active adjustment 
precisely in order to ensure continuity.”128 Concerning multilateralism and the use 
of force, the next section will explore the changes which took place without 
altering Germany's main course in security affairs. At the same time, the adoption 
of the concept of comprehensive security will be shown to be a reason for these 
adjustments. 
b. Changes in Multilateralism and the Use of Force since 
1989 and their Causes 
Multilateralism and the use of force are important features when 
examining Germany's security culture because exactly these parts of Germany's 
state behavior, from a realist point of view, might have changed significantly after 
the reunification and the dissolution of the bipolar power balance.129 
Nevertheless, since the events of 1989 and 1990, there have been no indications 
of an emerging strong unilateral and militaristic inclination from Germany.  
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The integration of Germany into all the major institutions which 
were founded after World War II and the proactive role Germany played in them 
were perceived as a means to regain trust and respect for the new democratic 
Germany and, thus, readmission into the international community of states.130 
Moreover, the increasing involvement in institutions during these years has led to 
a degree of integration, which goes beyond intergovernmentalism and includes 
ceding national sovereignty, especially at the European level.131 The 
supranational first Maastricht pillar of the EU is evidence of this development. At 
the same time, the strong antimilitarist mood after World War II, including the 
strong resistance against rearmament and nuclear deterrence, also stimulated 
Germany’s self-conception as a civilian power, which was generally critical of the 
utility of force.132 The strong bonds of multilateral cooperation as well as a pacifist 
approach to international affairs had a combined effect. Thus, through active 
participation in several security institutions, Germany has become a reliable 
partner in security affairs. Furthermore, Germany also received a certain formal 
and informal amount of influence in these institutions. Hence, wherever Germany 
has been able to influence decisions of institutions and to determine what 
instruments to use, it has tried to prevent the use of (military) force, at least as a 
first reaction. Also, the engagement in arms control negotiations has given 
Germany the leverage to support non-violent actions.  
However, since the end of the Cold War, one might identify 
adjustments regarding multilateralism and the use of force. With simultaneous 
consideration of a general continuity in Germany's security culture regarding 
multilateralism and the use of force, four areas with tendencies towards change 
might be identified. Because this thesis argues that the adoption of the 
comprehensive approach in Europe since 1989 might lead to a convergence in a 
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European security culture, explanations for the adjustments in security culture 
are based on elements of comprehensive security. 
(1) First, one observes a more assertive multilateralism 
combined with the use of force abroad. Today, Germany has deployed more than 
7,300 soldiers outside its own borders. The main contingents are those in 
Afghanistan and Uzbekistan (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF) as 
well as in Kosovo (Kosovo Force, KFOR).133 All of the nine different operations 
are under the aegis either of the UN, EU or NATO. Hence, one of the bedrocks of 
German security culture, the strong reliance on multilateralism and international 
institutions, is progressing also with its armed forces abroad. However, this more 
assertive multilateralism, that is, the active participation with military elements, is 
a development that did not begin until the crises in Yugoslavia and Somalia in the 
early 1990s. However, even in the 1991 war in Iraq, Germany provided its 
multilateral duty with financial contributions. From then on, German soldiers were 
frequently sent abroad under the auspices of international institutions. The use of 
force abroad, a clear adjustment of the earlier civilian multilateralism, acquired a 
wide acceptance amongst the German elite. Similarly, pacifist intellectuals 
consented to this step under certain conditions.134 This changing security culture 
was reflected in a revised interpretation of the German constitution, which was 
approved by the German Federal Constitutional Court in 1994.135 The public, as 
well as the media, welcomed the judicial affirmation136 and confirmed this new 
alignment of security culture as a property of a collective. Since then, Germany 
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has generally been willing to back civilian processes with use of military force 
abroad.137 However, the use of military force abroad is generally limited to 
peacekeeping and peace building missions. In this respect, the case of Kosovo is 
the exception and was domestically debated. Evidence for the preponderance of 
non-peace enforcement operations is provided by non-participation in the 2003 
war in Iraq. Further evidence is offered by the current public opinion about the 
Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan, where a majority supports deployment in 
the more peaceful northern part, but dislikes the extension of the mission to the 
south with reconnaissance aircraft and special forces.138 
Germany's comprehensive approach to security might serve 
as explanation for this alignment of security culture. First, as seen, the 
cooperative approach, that is the willingness to act multilaterally in security 
affairs, is strongly reflected in Germany's comprehensive concept of security.139 
Accordingly, Germany has had to take responsibility as a reliable member of the 
different security institutions in which it is member. In other words, as the security 
environment after the Cold War asked more for Peace Support Operations (PSO) 
with military elements, Germany, as an advocate of the institutions that stand 
behind these operations, had to contribute as well. That is, “Germany has come 
under growing external pressure to assume greater global responsibility for the 
promotion and preservation of peace.”140 Second, in contrast to the Cold War, 
Germany's concept of comprehensive security proceeds also on the assumption 
that non-state actors can seriously threaten Germany's security. In this context, 
the societal aspect of comprehensive security shifts away from state actors as 
well and assumes other actors organized on a societal base organized actors 
                                            
137. Chancellor Angela Merkel in US Fed News, “German Security Policy based on 
Partnership,” November 10, 2006. 
138. Infratest dimap. Electoral and political research. http://www.infratest-dimap .de /? 
id=39&aid=148 (accessed 14 May 2007) shows a majority of 52% for the engagement generally, 
but only a minority of 35% welcomes the deployment of Tornado recce aircraft in the southern 
part of Afghanistan. 
139. See Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, White Paper 2006, 24, “German Security 
policy is committed to effective multilateralism." 
140. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, 47.  
 45
outside traditional state entities. Hence, on the one hand, such collectives might 
display a threat and have, therefore, to be confronted with military means outside 
the borders of Germany; on the other hand, societal groups may be groups to 
protect. Nationalist and ethnic conflicts are examples of such security challenges 
of non-state actors, which might involve a role for military force.141 Finally, the 
aspect of human security in Germany's concept of comprehensive security has 
contributed as well to a more assertive multilateralism and the use of force 
abroad. For Germany, the military intervention in Bosnia was a pivotal point in 
declaring the use of force as legitimate in cases of humanitarian crisis.142  
(2) Second, Germany acts, if necessary, on a more assertive 
bilateral basis. White Paper 2006 confirms the need for bilateral cooperation and 
describes this as “a significant element of German security and stability 
policy."143 Germany, though, is keen to prevent tensions in security relations. 
Therefore, it takes active part in a wide range of multilateral institutions. Selective 
bilateral action has taken place after 1989; at the beginning with Central and East 
European states, and after their integration in the EU and NATO, in particular 
with Russia.144 One of the more extreme examples of this development was the 
diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in late 1991. However, such 
bilateral (or in the case of Slovenia and Croatia even unilateral) action has 
generally been backed through institutions. Moreover, bilateral action was often 
bent on future integration in an institution.145 Consequently, in this respect, the 
alignment in Germany's security culture is only a minor one. Nevertheless, one 
may observe a difference to the time before 1989. 
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The explanation for this adjustment can be found, again, in 
Germany's increased comprehensive approach to security after the end of the 
Cold War. First, the notion of interdependence brought in by the liberal 
institutionalist school of thought, is a significant element of comprehensive 
security. With its additional bilateral diplomacy on a selective basis, besides the 
multinational commitments, Germany corresponds with this element. Second, 
because, for example, environmental issues are indeed elements of a 
comprehensive understanding of security, but still often not part of multilateral 
security institutions, Germany chooses the bilateral way to bridge this gap.146 
Finally, especially in bilateral relations with Russia, energy issues play a 
significant role. This corresponds clearly with Germany's comprehensive 
approach to security which includes the question of energy as well.147 
(3) Third, one notices a slow change in the priorities of 
multilateral security institutions. Regarding security, for Germany before 1989, 
Europe and the EU stood, besides the primarily economic integration, for a 
growing inclusive security community among the European states, former 
enemies in World War II. To be in this community and the strong commitment to 
it has been deeply entrenched in Germany's security culture. In contrast, NATO 
was chiefly perceived as a security institution which provided collective defense 
for its members against enemies from outside of the alliance (even though 
“keeping the Germans down,” in Lord Ismay’s wording, was also prevalent). 
However, after the end of the Cold War, the EU adopted a more robust attitude 
towards security issues. The formation of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) 1993, the European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) 1996 
as a European Pillar in NATO, the European Security and Defense Policy 
(EDSP) in 1999 and finally the ESS in 2003 are milestones in the development of 
a more confident Europe acting increasingly autonomously in military terms. 
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Germany was, from the beginning, one of the leading advocates for a stronger 
EU military commitment. Public opinion polls from 2003 reveal that 44 percent of 
the Germans thought decisions about European security should be made by the 
EU itself, while only 15 percent preferred NATO.148 Similarly, a poll from 2006 
shows that a vast majority of Germans advocated decision-making regarding 
security issues on a European level.149 Nevertheless, German politicians still 
stress the importance of NATO and its relevance for Germany's security 
policy.150 
Germany's comprehensive approach to security offers a 
possible explanation for this shift in priorities. The comprehensive approach 
includes the societal aspect. In this connection, Europe is seen as an evolving 
security community.151 Indeed, the transatlantic multilateral cooperation via 
NATO, represents a security community as well. However, on the one hand, the 
security dimension of the EU is rising and offers new perspectives. On the other 
hand, the dispute over the 2003 Iraq war has called into question one of the main 
characteristics of a security community, the “shared identities, values and 
meanings,”152 between Germany and the main proponent of NATO, the U.S. 
(4) Fourth, Germany has implemented a feature to 
accomplish additional democratic accountability for the use of armed force 
abroad. The German Constitutional Court, in its judgment in 1994, clarified not 
only the conditions under which the German Armed Forces are allowed to be 
deployed but decided also that such a deployment needs the approval of a 
majority of Members of the German Parliament. Before the end of the Cold War, 
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the question about a deployment could not arise, as the interpretation of the 
German Constitution only allowed participation in operations to defend NATO 
territory.153 However, after the 1991 Iraq war, for which Germany only made 
financial contributions, the Bundeswehr was deployed in Somalia (UNSOM II) as 
well as with AWACS reconnaissance flights in Bosnia. These missions were not 
formally approved by the parliament and were disputed by the opposition, which 
triggered the decision of the Constitutional Court in 1994. Since then, the 
parliament has approved all deployments of German troops abroad. Together 
with general parliamentary oversights, such as a permanent defense committee, 
an office of a parliamentary ombudsman and budget power, strong parliamentary 
control of the use of its armed forces has become part of Germany's security 
culture.154 
Again, the explication for this further feature of German 
security culture, the approval of the parliament, can be found in the amplified 
comprehensive approach since 1989. Germany's comprehensive understanding 
of security entails a high level of commitment to multilateral institutions. This 
leads to the participation in out-of-area operations. Because such missions go 
beyond traditional homeland defense, the decisions about deploying forces 
abroad are always very political. As a result, democratic accountability is to be 
secured by the say of the parliament. Furthermore, the comprehensive approach 
highlights the blending between civil and military domains. For example, threats 
to security may be from civil or military origin or the instruments, which are used 
to produce security, may come from both sides. Consequently, the right of the 
parliament strengthens civilian oversight over such operations.  
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3. Conclusion 
Since the 1970s, Germany has made hesitant attempts to broaden its 
understanding of security. This process had been launched primarily by 
academic scholars and had mainly concerned the economic widening of security. 
However, the end of the Cold War and subsequent reunification of the two 
German states enabled the breakthrough of the comprehensive security concept. 
The various White Papers after 1989/1990 included more and more elements of 
human, environmental, and societal security. Simultaneously, the policies of the 
government followed this progress quite closely. The reactions to the wars in the 
Balkans in the early 1990s are evidence for this development.  
Nevertheless, Germany’s security culture has been remarkably persistent. 
Above all, the strong commitment to multilateral actions has remained a hallmark 
in Germany’s security culture. Yet, in the area of multilateralism and the use of 
force, some adjustments have taken place; although without leaving the general 
path of continuity. These modifications can be explained by the increasing 
adoption of comprehensive security notions. One observes chiefly four areas of 
slight change: First, Germany’s multilateralism has become more assertive while 
using force in out-of-area operations. The more than 7,000 deployed soldiers 
emphasize this. Second, if necessary, Germany acts also on a bilateral basis, 
outside multilateral institutions, primarily, with respect to countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Third, the ties to European security institutions (CFSP, ESDP) 
have become closer while the membership in NATO seems to stagnate. Finally, 
there is a comparably significant amount of democratic accountability when 
Germany uses its armed forces abroad. 
B. GREAT BRITAIN 
The Great Britain case study follows the same outline as the one about 
Germany. The first section details the emergence of the idea of comprehensive 
security in Great Britain, mainly through examination of security White Papers, 
and the second section addresses Britain’s security culture.  
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More specifically, the case study will first describe the advent of Britain’s 
understanding of comprehensive security in its security documents since the end 
of the Cold War. This part ends with a closer look at the issues of multilateralism 
and the use of force in the current White Paper of 2006. Second, after a general 
outline of Britain’s security culture with a focus on multilateralism and the use of 
force, four main adjustments in the security culture since 1989/1990 will be 
addressed. The notion of comprehensive security will serve as an explanation for 
these adjustments. 
1. Comprehensive Security 
a.  Overview 1989 – 2006 
Before 1989, Great Britain’s White Paper barely displayed any 
ideas of comprehensive security. For example, the 1986 White Paper focused 
chiefly on the challenges presented by the Soviet Union and its military 
capabilities. However, one can observe two humble approaches towards 
comprehensive security. On the one hand, the question of collective security was 
addressed. This was chiefly an effect of Britain’s membership in NATO. On the 
other hand, the threat assessment also included the danger of terrorist attacks.155 
This expansion towards non-state actors was a consequence of the long-
standing deployment of the British Army in Northern Ireland. This enlargement to 
different new categories of threat was also the first main change in the security 
documents after the end of the Cold War. In other words, a new threat 
assessment was the basis for the 1990 Defense Review “Options for Change” 
and the following 1991 Defense White Paper.156 As a result, the immediate 
changes after the end of the Cold War towards a more comprehensive approach 
were made only at a modest level. Nevertheless, at the same time, academics 
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and politicians stressed the need for a broadening of the concept of security. 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher even warned of the threat of global 
warming.157 Moreover, the increasing involvement in economic institutions 
through globalization, a closer relationship to the Continent and new economic 
options after the collapse of the Soviet Union spilled over to the area of security. 
However, Great Britain continued to initially define its security policy in a narrow 
sense. As Louise Richardson observes: 
But although emphasis on economic ties and mutual interests 
arising from interdependence figure prominently in political rhetoric, 
decision makers clearly did not see such factors as playing a 
significant role in the definition of security….158 
The calls by academia and politicians for a more comprehensive 
approach towards security as well as the reality of deployments of the British 
military in peacekeeping operations finally found resonance in the security 
documents of the late 1990s. The change from the conservative government to 
the Labour Party in 1997 was the trigger for this adjustment in Great Britain. In 
that respect, the 1998 Strategic Defense White Paper159  marked a radical 
change in content and language. A direct military attack on the United Kingdom 
was no longer perceived as a threat. Instead, a new threat - largely 
environmental - became the primary venue of analysis. 
Environmental degradation, ethnic tensions, population pressures, 
competition for resources, and the collapse of states which may 
result, also fuel instability and human misery.160 
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Moreover, the set of tools used to face the new threats was 
enlarged. For instance, defense diplomacy was introduced as a new defense 
mission.161 Defense diplomacy was defined as follows: 
To provide forces to meet the varied activities undertaken by the 
MOD to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the 
development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby 
making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and 
resolution.162 
In addition, the 1998 Strategic Defense White Paper was the first 
security paper of the newly elected Labor government. It strove to institutionalize 
its new ideas and values. As a result, elements of human security as well as a 
societal approach found a prominent place in the security document. Accordingly, 
Prime Minister Blair explained: 
Our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self-
interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In 
the end, values and interests merge. If we can establish and spread 
the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open 
society that is in our national interests too. The spread of our values 
makes us safer.163 
The 2004 Defense White Paper maintained the elements derived 
from a broader understanding of security. However, in the shadow of the 2001 
terror attacks and the following war in Iraq side by side with the U.S., emphasis 
was placed on the war on terror, and, therefore, a wider threat assessment was  
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presented. In that view, three main threats stood at the forefront of the document: 
international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 
weak and failing states.164  
Finally, the strategy paper released by the Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) in 2006, “Active Diplomacy for a Changing World: 
The UK’s International Priorities,”165 offers a current and comprehensive view of 
Britain’s security strategy. The paper proceeds on the assumption of a broad 
approach to security. It addresses issues such as “world economics, population 
development, environmental aspects, resources and energy problems.”166 
Furthermore, this security paper from the FCO unveils also the so called “Blair 
Doctrine,” meaning the inclusion of human, democratic, and development values 
in Britain’s foreign policy.167 In sum, together with the White Paper from the 
Ministry of Defense of 2004, Great Britain’s current security documents describe, 
in detail, an approach to comprehensive security which includes elements of 
human, environmental, and societal security. 
b. Multilateralism and the Use of Force 
The 2006 White Paper from the FCO dedicates a whole chapter to 
the role of Great Britain in the international system.168 The White Paper attaches 
great importance to cooperation with other states. The introduction to the 
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document states that “the international system based on effective multilateral 
institutions and shared values has long been a cornerstone of British foreign 
policy.”169 Nevertheless, although emphasis is on multilateral institutions, the 
FCO White Paper divides its chapter about the role of Great Britain in the 
international system into the three subchapters “International Organizations,” 
“European Union,” and “United States.” This division reveals two aspects. First, it 
shows Great Britain’s view of its position in the world as involving three key 
relationships: to the U.S. as its main ally, to Europe, and to global organizations. 
The listing also discloses Britain’s role as a mediator between the U.S. and 
Europe and its desire for a prominent role in international organizations. Second, 
the citation of the single bilateral relationship with the U.S. mitigates Great 
Britain’s commitment to multilateral institutions.  
The ramification of this policy also concerns the use of force. When 
comparing the FCO Paper from 2006 with the White Paper from the Ministry of 
Defense of 2004, this effect can be observed even more clearly. Where the 
former mentions that Great Britain will “continue to support an effective system 
for multilateral co-operation, based in international law…,”170 the latter declares 
that “…the most demanding operations could only conceivably be undertaken 
alongside the U.S., either as a NATO operation or a US led coalition.”171 In other 
words, Great Britain’s will to act in a multilateral framework based on 
international law is not unlimited. For instance, when it comes to efforts against 
international terrorism, the question of multilateralism is of secondary 
consideration. The war in Iraq in a coalition outside of an international 
organization is evidence of this attitude. 
With respect to the use of force as an instrument available to tackle 
the challenges, the British security documents point out the combined use of both 
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military and civilian tools. In this respect, Secretary of Defense Desmond Browne 
explained that only the application of all the different means, “diplomacy, 
economics, military muscle, and development,”172 will lead to success. One has 
to add that there are differences between documents from the Ministry of 
Defense and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. In general, the documents of 
the Foreign & Commonwealth Office highlight more the multilateral aspect and 
the commitment to international law.   
In sum, during the Cold War, but also after the events of 
1989/1990, ideas of a wider understanding of security were barely adopted in 
Britain’s White Papers. However, in the late 1990s, the inclusion of elements of 
comprehensive security occurred simultaneously and in a broad manner. 
2. Security Culture  
a. Overview 
The security culture of Great Britain from World War II to the 
present time is marked by its particular position between Europe, the U.S., and 
Britain’s own sphere of influence, the Commonwealth. As a result, one may 
speak about “three circles of influence,”173 which affect British attitudes regarding 
security issues. Moreover, a further continual pattern of behavior has been the 
will to play a significant role in the international system. Several conditions have 
facilitated this special position: the status as a nuclear power; permanent 
membership in the Security Council of the UN; the pivotal standing in 
international security organizations such as NATO or OSCE; the role as a 
mediator on the one hand between Europe and the U.S. and on the other hand 
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(during the Cold War) between the U.S. and the USSR.174 Britain’s security has 
been primarily dependent on its relationship with the U.S. The so called “special 
relationship” between Great Britain and the U.S. was established during World 
War II. It refers generally to a shared identity (basically on a similar culture, 
language, and history), which has led to common interests and, therefore, to this 
close relationship.175 As a second priority, security should be safeguarded on the 
one hand by NATO and on the other hand by the security institutions of Europe, 
that is the West European Union (WEU) initially and then the ESDP.  
Despite the fact that the international system, and therefore also the “three 
circles,” have changed dramatically since World War II, Great Britain’s security 
culture is marked by continuity. In other words, neither the loss of its Empire (with 
its climax in 1956 during the Suez crisis), nor the end of the bipolar world along 
with the reunification of Germany caused a striking change in Britain’s security 
culture. Similarly, the elections of 1997, with the change from a Conservative 
government to a government of the Labor Party, have not resulted in a prominent 
change in Britain’s security culture, but rather in additional adjustments to it. 
However, in particular, the events of 1989/1990 have led to a modification in 
Great Britain’s security culture. In this respect, the questions of multilateralism 
and the use of force are dealt with differently than in the era of the Cold War.  
b. Changes in Multilateralism and the Use of Force since 
1989 and their Causes 
Great Britain’s security culture in respect to multilateralism is, first 
of all, shaped by its particular geographic position. Britain’s insular location and 
the resulting different options concerning cooperation has led to a security culture 
which is skeptical about unconditional multilateralism. Moreover, Great Britain 
has always tried to balance every hegemonic aspiration on the European 
continent. Hence, membership in alliances is not an entrenched idea in Britain’s 
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security culture. From the end of World War II on, because of its shrinking 
influence, Britain’s attitude to balancing and to stabilizing the international system 
has oscillated between a careful multilateralism on European issues and a 
special, bilateral relationship with the U.S. In addition, despite the decline as an 
imperial power along with the economic advantage of Germany and France on 
the European continent, the strong Atlantic relationship enabled Great Britain to 
hold up its international reputation.176 
However, despite a constant underlying isolationist tendency and 
the bilateral relationship with the U.S., Great Britain’s security culture, as seen 
regarding Europe, has always had a multilateral facet. Therefore, British decision 
makers had to take into account the membership of their country in multilateral 
organizations and the stance of other nations in them.177 In this respect, NATO 
has played the most important role for Great Britain, the more so because of the 
dominant role of the U.S. in NATO.  
Furthermore, the membership in international organizations was 
propelled by increased economic involvement. The accession to the EU in 1973 
was a keystone in this advancement. After 1989/1990, increasing globalization, 
new economic options after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the single 
market of the EU have all consolidated this outcome. One can observe a spill-
over effect from economic issues to security affairs. Great Britain’s welcoming of 
NATO as a more political forum and the rapprochement to a common European 
defense policy are just two examples of these spill-over effects.178 Consequently, 
there have been some adjustments of Britain’s security culture in the sphere of 
multilateralism. 
Similarly, modifications have taken place with respect to the use of 
force. Until the end of the Cold War, Great Britain used force mainly to protect its 
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own interests. Military engagements in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Suez, Aden, 
Borneo, and the Falklands belonged to this category.179 Military operations based 
on a mandate of an international organization were exceptions. In contrast, after 
1989/1990, the basis for out-of-area missions broadened. The following four 
adjustments and their explanations based on comprehensive security illustrate 
the most relevant ones. 
(1) First, Great Britain increasingly uses force abroad in 
support of peace missions in a multilateral context, gradually more in order to 
defend human rights. This modification in the sphere of security culture has two 
origins. On the one side, there obviously is an increased willingness to contribute 
to peacekeeping missions together with other nations. Such missions regularly 
take place in a multilateral framework. Since the end of the Cold War, Great 
Britain has become a significant provider of troops for such multilateral peace 
operations.180 The operations, in which Great Britain participates, are not limited 
to traditional peacekeeping. Peace enforcement operations are also part of these 
engagements. Moreover, state-building is a significant task in these missions.181 
As a result, the increased involvement abroad affects not only military means but 
also further diplomatic and economic instruments. Indeed, Great Britain was also 
involved in operations abroad before 1989/1990. But these operations served 
mainly the purpose of colonial possessions and interests and were not part of a 
peace operation.182  Therefore, the use of force in support of these interests was 
exercised by British forces only and not in the context of a multilateral force. The 
preconditions to allow engagement in multilateral peace operations abroad were  
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one of the first measures taken shortly after the end of the Cold War. Junior 
Defense Minister Alan Clark was one of the advocates to enhance the "capability 
for out-of-area operations."183 
On the other side, one observes a slight change regarding 
the ends or the aims of out-of-area operations. When the Labor Party came to 
power in 1997, the so called "Blair Doctrine" was introduced. This doctrine 
permits the use of force when pursuing "good ends."184 The NATO campaign in 
Kosovo was the first implementation of this doctrine. Accordingly, Prime Minister 
Blair described the intervention in Kosovo "not as a fight for territory, but for 
values."185 For Great Britain, the use of force was "a legitimate instrument to use 
against a state who had been committing egregious human rights violations."186 
The implementation of the "Blair Doctrine" in Kosovo was strongly backed by 
public opinion. A poll conducted a week after the beginning of the bombings in 
Kosovo showed an affirmation of 76 percent in contrast to a 16 percent rejection 
of this kind of use of force. After a month of the air raids, the satisfaction was still 
at 57 percent, compared with 31 percent dissatisfaction.187  
Great Britain's comprehensive approach towards security 
may serve as an explanation of this gradual shift in Britain's security culture. The 
accrued involvements in peace operations and in particular the intervention - also 
with the use of hard military force188 - when human rights are violated, show that 
human security norms indeed are put into practice. To engage in intra-state 
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conflicts, such as Bosnia or Kosovo, in order to prevent the abuse of 
humanitarian values, goes clearly beyond the traditional notion of a state-centric 
understanding of security. Moreover, in both Bosnia and Kosovo, the 
humanitarian intervention took place in favor of certain groups of people. Striving 
for the security of a particular group of people (e.g. Bosnians, Kosovo-Albanians) 
reflects norms of societal security, which go beyond a narrow realist approach. In 
addition, to fight for "good ends" and to be engaged in state building demand the 
employment not only of the military but also of a full spectrum of civil-military and 
civil instruments. This group of instruments and their interdependent use is 
likewise based on a wider understanding of security. Finally, Britain's amplified 
involvement in multilateral peacekeeping operations has to be seen, as well, from 
the point of view of possible spill-over effects of conflicts. Violence may harm the 
economy of Great Britain or cause increased migration. A comprehensive 
approach towards security acknowledges exactly such threats as deserving 
attention along with the traditional strictly military threat. 
(2) Second, Great Britain often acts multilaterally, but not 
necessarily in an institutional framework. After the Cold War, Great Britain's 
balancing act between the U.S. and Europe opened the whole spectrum 
regarding whom to work with in security issues. These days, Britain performs 
most of its security policies in a bilateral or a multilateral way. Bilaterally, Great 
Britain works chiefly with its closest ally, the U.S.; nuclear collaboration and 
sharing intelligence information are two main examples of this bilateral 
relationship.189 This special relationship is an entrenched part of Britain's security 
culture and evidence for this is the enduring character of the relationship despite 
changes of government on both sides.190 Institutionally, in the multilateral  
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context, there are several security institutions in which Great Britain adopts a 
pivotal position: NATO, the UN, EU (CFSP, ESDP), and OSCE belong to this 
category.  
However, since the end of the Cold War, one observes 
cases in which Britain’s multilateral efforts take place outside of institutions. The 
main example is the current war in Iraq where Great Britain is part of the 
“coalition of the willing.”191 This coalition is a multinational force which has been 
built beyond the framework of a security institution. The second example is the 
air campaign in Kosovo. Indeed, the operation was conducted by NATO. 
Nevertheless, the members of NATO acted without the prior consent of the UN 
Security Council. Overall, Great Britain’s attitude toward acting with partners may 
be described as “multilateralism a la carte,”192 meaning that depending on the 
specific situation, Great Britain acts within or outside of a security institution.  
After the change of Prime Minister from Tony Blair to Gordon 
Brown in the summer of 2007, first tendencies show a lesser commitment to the 
mission in Iraq. One can observe a more independent British position. The plan 
to redeploy several hundred British soldiers at the end of 2007 and to generally 
rethink the situation in Iraq illustrates this tendency.193 However, Great Britain 
remains for the time being the most important partner of the U.S. in the "coalition 
of the willing" in Iraq. 
This modification of Great Britain’s security culture can not 
be explained by the adoption of comprehensive security. In contrast, the 
comprehensive approach towards security actually calls for institutionalized 
multilateralism. Consequently, the applied freedom of choice whether to take  
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security measures inside or outside an institutional frame is an adjustment in 
Great Britain’s security culture that runs counter to the notion of comprehensive 
security. 
(3) Third, one perceives a slight change in the relationship to 
multilateral security institutions. Out of the “three circles of influence,”194 Europe, 
the U.S., and the Commonwealth, only the Atlanticist and the European ones 
have remained important as concerns security collaboration. The decline of the 
Empire reduced the impact of the Commonwealth on Great Britain also in 
security affairs.195 Regarding security institutions, the Atlanticist and the 
European circle are represented by NATO and the EU (CFSP\ESDP) 
respectively. After 1989/1990, on the European side, Great Britain moved closer 
to its continental allies as never seen before in the period since World War II. The 
most important step was the rapprochement toward France with the Anglo-
French summit in Saint-Malo in 1998. As a direct result, the European Union 
sanctioned the emergence of ESDP at its summit in Cologne in June 1999. One 
might sense this process as a "major shift in British security policy."196 However, 
Great Britain’s ties to NATO and its major ally, the U.S., are still very strong. 
Indeed, ESDP was specifically designed to strengthen the European pillar of 
NATO and thus NATO itself. From this point of view, the move towards a 
European framework of security confirms Britain’s determination to maintain an 
effective NATO and to engage the U.S. in this framework as well. In other words, 
one identifies Great Britain also in this case as mediator between Europe and the 
U.S. Moreover, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when some authors 
predicted the demise of the transatlantic security collaboration,197 NATO 
transformed itself into a successful security management institution. Moreover, 
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after the 2001 terrorist attacks on September 11, one can literally speak of a 
“resurgent Atlanticist identity which is shaping British foreign policy.”198  
As a result, the approximation to the European security 
structure clearly reveals Britain’s particular position between the Atlanticist and 
the European circle. In other words, there is an area of tension in which the 
British security culture ranges. Therefore, Great Britain does not decide between 
one of the security institutions, but rather seeks to use its new position in the 
European circle to stress commonalities and collaboration. In one of his first 
speeches, Secretary of State Browne introduced the question of how ”NATO and 
the EU can work better together.”199 In sum, the rapprochement towards the 
European security structure does not embody new priorities in Britain’s security 
culture. Nevertheless, it is a modification regarding the relationships on both 
sides of the Atlantic. And in this respect, the relationship to Europe and its 
security institutions has been strengthened. 
The increased implementation of comprehensive security in 
Great Britain offers possible explanations for the slight rearrangement between 
the Atlanticist and Europeanist alignment. Britain’s rapprochement with the 
European security structure is a move towards a regional security community. 
Because many threats of comprehensive security (for example migration, certain 
environmental issues, intra-state ethnic clashes) may be tackled more effectively 
by a regional security community, Great Britain has been a chief architect of the 
new security cooperation within the EU. Interestingly, the last stage of the 
rapprochement (in particular between France and Great Britain) has been 
facilitated by the common military engagement in the Balkans, especially in  
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Bosnia. This engagement was an operation in order to prevent a humanitarian 
crisis, in other words, an intervention according to the notion of comprehensive 
security.   
(4) Finally, one observes an increased democratic scrutiny of 
the parliament in case of the use of force abroad. In Great Britain, the 
responsibilities for military engagements are mainly privileges granted to the 
executive. That is, the government has the most power because of its 
competence or delegated authority from the Crown.200 There is no mandatory 
parliamentary approval and even the courts do not have the power to review 
decisions of the executive regarding the use of force. While engaging troops, 
even the Cabinet is limited to a War Cabinet with a reduced number of 
members.201 Consequently, the system seems to be one without strong 
democratic accountability. However, since the end of the Cold War, the 
parliament has become more involved in decisions about the use of force. Above 
all, the use of “internationally sanctioned forces in nondefensive actions has 
brought the tension to a head.”202 As a result, the parliament is pushing for more 
debate and input about deployments of British Forces. Kosovo and Iraq 2003 are 
examples of this trend. Obviously, the involvement of the parliament is stronger 
in combat missions than in peace operations. Hence, when the parliament 
perceives a mission as more dangerous, it seeks to be more progressively 
involved.203 Nevertheless, there is no need for a compulsory parliamentary 
approval, and the increased involvement of the parliament is simply attributed to 
an “upward trend in debate in parliament.” 204 
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The explanation for this increased involvement of the 
parliament is again related to the notion of comprehensive security. First, military 
deployments to prevent humanitarian crises are perceived as part of a 
comprehensive understanding of security. Accordingly, a report from the British 
Foreign Affairs Committee in 2000, after the war in Kosovo, recommended larger 
parliamentary oversight when conducting such operations, because “the doctrine 
of humanitarian intervention has a tenuous basis in current customary 
international law.”205 Second, in operations for reasons other than defense (and 
therefore part of the comprehensive approach), the possibility of “mission creep” 
exists. In other words, because of a changing environment, the tasks for the 
forces deployed can change as well.206 Consequently, there is more need for 
parliamentary scrutiny not only at the beginning but also during a mission. Third, 
Britain’s out-of-area deployments have become more comprehensive operations, 
and therefore involve a large number of civilian instruments in order to support 
the military. However, the narrow circles of a government, or even a War 
Cabinet, are not able to take these non-military means adequately into account. 
Two factors limit the ability of a small government circle to conduct an operation 
with a comprehensive approach. First, there is the danger of “military 
professionals dominating the politicians.”207 Second, when only a small War 
Cabinet is conducting such a mission, there is the danger of tunnel vision which 
is in particular not wished for in a mission with several civilian, military, and even 
private actors.208 Hence, the collaboration of the parliament is needed. 
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3. Conclusion 
Before the end of the Cold War, Great Britain’s security documents did not 
include many elements of comprehensive security. Also after 1989/1990, only 
subtle changes could be observed; the changes took place chiefly regarding 
threat assessment, where Britain had had long experience with the terrorist 
threat in Northern Ireland. However, academic scholars, politicians, and finally 
the change of government in the second half of the 1990s brought almost all 
parts of comprehensive security into the readjusted security documents. 
Therefore, regarding the implementation on policy level, one can speak more of 
an almost instantaneous than a long-evolving change. Since then, in the newly 
released security documents, the approach to comprehensive security has 
become more refined. Nevertheless, there are differences between documents 
from the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. One of 
the main differences is that the latter is more forthcoming regarding multilateral 
actions in an institutional frame and the use of force according to international 
law.    
Great Britain’s security culture still ranges between its relationship to the 
U.S., Europe and the Commonwealth. Often, Britain acts as a mediator among 
these different circles. Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War, Great Britain 
has experienced some modifications in its security culture which may be traced 
back to the adoption of a comprehensive approach towards security. First, Great 
Britain deploys its military forces more and more as part of international 
peacekeeping missions. This is distinct from the years before 1989/1990, when 
British troops mainly were engaged overseas to secure British colonial interests.  
Second, Great Britain is willing to act on a non-institutional multilateral base, if 
necessary. Membership in the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq is the main example 
of this development. Third, Great Britain appears to be moving closer to the 




the U.S. remains strong. Finally, although the executive still has the priority in 
decisions about military engagements, the parliament has increased its influence 
in this respect.  
Overall, this suggests a mixed conclusion: in some areas the idea of 
comprehensive security is strongly reflected in changes in the security culture, 
but in other areas the comprehensive security impulse is limited by continuing 
Atlanticist elements of Britain's security culture. 
C. SWITZERLAND 
This third case study follows the same pattern as the preceding ones. A 
first section will explore the acceptance of comprehensive security in 
Switzerland's White Papers, and a second section will examine Switzerland's 
security culture 
More specifically, in the first part, a survey of security papers will explain 
the incremental appearance of comprehensive security in Switzerland’s security 
documents. The approach towards multilateralism and the use of force in the 
current White Paper of 1999 will be specifically explored. Then, after a generic 
review of Switzerland's security culture, again with a concentration on 
multilateralism and the question of the use of force, adjustments in security 
culture since the end of the Cold War will be presented. The increased 
emergence of the notion of comprehensive security will function as an 
explanation for these modifications in Switzerland's security culture.  
1. Comprehensive Security 
a.  Overview 1989 – 2006 
Switzerland does not regularly publish White Papers about security. 
The security documents are released at the discretion of the government and 
seek to cover at least a mid-term period into the future. As a result, since the end 
of the Cold War, only two main reports about security were issued: in 1990 and in 
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1999.209 Nevertheless, their titles "Swiss Security Policy in Transition," and 
"Security through Cooperation," respectively, indicate alterations and changes in 
Switzerland's security policy after the events of 1989/1990. Furthermore, one 
may observe a gradual inclusion of comprehensive security in these two security 
papers. 
Switzerland's security reports from the early 1970s already 
incorporated elements of a broader understanding of security. The conception of 
a "comprehensive defense" included a wide range of instruments in order to 
"ensure peace in independence."210 However, the focus clearly still rested on a 
realist military approach to security. For instance, all measures were limited to 
the territory of Switzerland and the main perceived threat was a military attack on 
the country. There was a clear distinction between the tasks assigned to the 
armed forces and the responsibilities assigned to the civilian agencies. This was 
a consequence of the segregation of security and foreign policy in Switzerland at 
that time. Humanitarian engagements, good offices, or multilateral cooperation in 
economic and social questions were treated outside the realm of security. This 
delineation of responsibility only became mitigated in the mid 1970s, promoted in 
part by the signature of the "Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe" in 1975.211   
An intermediate White Paper in 1979212 and two general principles 
for the armed forces in 1975213 and 1982214 did not yet include more elements of 
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comprehensive security and did not yet completely close the gap between 
security and foreign policy. One exception was the mentioning of an economic 
threat.215 This exception can be directly attributed to the 1973 oil crisis and the 
following recession as well as Switzerland’s dependence on raw materials. 
Shortly after the end of the Cold War in 1990, the Swiss Federal 
Council issued a White Paper entitled “Swiss Security Policy in Transition" 
(SIPOL B 90). This document recognized the dimensions of the events in 
1989/1990 and marked the first change towards a broader, more comprehensive 
approach to security. Security was no longer perceived as a purely military affair. 
Moreover, the report also stated that an autonomous preservation of security was 
not possible anymore.216 Consequently, SIPOL B 90, with its wider 
understanding of security, was actually a comprehensive security document.217 
When taking into account the breathtaking pace of the events in 1989 and 1990, 
the issuance of SIPOL B 90 was a remarkable effort with such a new and clearly 
different approach to security so shortly after the demise of the bipolar world.218 
The two main aspects of comprehensive security that can be found 
in the report were the acknowledgement of new threats and the emphasis on 
multilateral cooperation in security issues. Regarding the threats, SIPOL B 90 
concluded: 
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Worldwide, it becomes increasingly manifest that there are further 
dangers which can at least threaten the existence of the state and 
the population. Their reasons are to be found in demographic, 
environmental, economic, and societal developments.219 
Consequently, an effect of this comprehensive understanding of 
security was the inclusion of the “protection of the population and its natural 
resources” and “a contribution to the international stability, above all in Europe” 
as security policy targets.220 These are referred to as “geographic and content-
oriented expansion of the risk spectrum.”221  
Overall, the report from 1990 was the starting point for the transition 
from an autonomous to a more cooperatively oriented security policy. 
Furthermore, it was generally a change to a broader understanding of security, 
most notably due to a wider understanding of the threat spectrum. However, 
despite the fact that the armed forces received the task of “promotion of peace,” 
its essence was still focused on the prevention of war through defense 
preparedness.222 
Finally, the 1999 White Paper (SIPOL B 2000) 223, the most current 
security document, offers an even more comprehensive approach towards 
security. Three reasons account for this further step in Switzerland’s security 
documents. First, in the mid 1990s, Switzerland played a very active role in the 
OSCE (until the 1995 Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe - 
CSCE) with the climax of the OSCE presidency in 1996. The OSCE itself is 
designed as an institution with a comprehensive agenda, including issues such 
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as security, economy, human rights, confidence-building, and preventive 
diplomacy. The active role while holding the OSCE presidency had a spillover 
effect into Switzerland’s domestic security policy. As a result, security and foreign 
policy became even more entwined and this has facilitated a more 
comprehensive approach towards security. Second, a study group appointed in 
1998 by the Federal Council of the Department of Defense, with former 
ambassador Edouard Brunner as its leader, came to the conclusion that only an 
enhanced cooperation with Switzerland’s neighbors as well as with the Atlantic 
and European security institutions would guarantee the security of the country.224 
The participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program in 1996 anticipated 
the recommendations of the study group. Third, the war in Kosovo and the 
following migration movements also proved that conflicts outside of the country 
can have an impact on Switzerland.225 
As a result, SIPOL B 2000 was named “Security through 
Cooperation” with two main efforts: 
On the one hand, it concerns the comprehensive but compared to 
the past more flexible, cooperation between all civilian and military 
assets serving our interests in security policy….On the other hand 
is an enhanced collaboration with international security 
organizations and friendly states in order to contribute, through 
mutually reinforcing co-operation, to stability and peace in our 
extended geographic sphere.226 
Furthermore, among the listed risks and opportunities, “Economic, 
social and ecological developments,” “Demographic developments, migration,” or 
“Natural and man/made disasters,” also indicate the comprehensive character of 
SIPOL B 2000.227  
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In sum, before the end of the Cold War, though Switzerland was 
active in humanitarian relief operations, good services, or multilateral cooperation 
in economic and social areas, the security documents strongly differentiated 
between security and foreign policy, as well as military and civilian instruments. 
As a result, the security reports were chiefly based on a narrow and military-
oriented approach towards security. Shortly after the events of 1989/1990, 
SIPOL B 90 included a wider threat assessment and moved into the direction of 
more multilateral cooperation, including interagency on the domestic level. 
However, SIPOL 90 was still characterized by an adherence to a state-centric 
definition of security.228 SIPOL B 2000 further developed the idea of a wider 
threat spectrum and the need for more cooperation, moving away from a state-
centered understanding of security. In addition, SIPOL B 2000 includes an even 
greater focus on the interdependence of security and foreign policy instruments.  
b. Multilateralism and the Use of Force 
The title of SIPOL B 2000 “Security through Cooperation” refers, on 
the one hand, to the collaboration of domestic military and civilian instruments, 
and, on the other hand, to the intention to work together with international 
partners. The latter is “not just an expression of solidarity, but a significant 
element of our [Switzerland’s] security policy serving our own interests.”229 
Regarding international cooperation, the SIPOL B 2000 security report lists the 
various international security institutions in which Switzerland is a member or 
which influence Switzerland’s position in the international system.230 Interestingly, 
the numeration starts with the UN, an institution in which Switzerland was not a 
member at the time of the issuance of the security report. Switzerland joined the 
UN as a full member in 2002. Nevertheless, the citation of the UN at such a 
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prominent place is justified by the fact that Switzerland took part in several 
programs and funds of the UN before 2002.231 
SIPOL B 2000 also mentions the limitation of Switzerland’s security 
cooperation: 
The limits of our security cooperation are set by two factors. A 
prerequisite for Swiss participation is that any peace support 
operation must have a clear legitimacy in international law 
(normally a UN Security Council or an OSCE mandate). In addition, 
the restrictions ensuing from the law of neutrality have to be 
observed.232 
In this context, since 1993, the Swiss Federal Council has taken the 
view that economic measures of coercion by the UN antecede the law of 
neutrality. Still, this attitude is not directly applicable to military measures of 
coercion. In this case, neutrality is kept in reserve.233 
 The limits of security cooperation also concern the use of force 
abroad. The detailed limitations and preconditions for the use of (military) force 
abroad are specified in Swiss military law. Along with the mandate of the UN 
Security Council or the OSCE, there are three further conditions. First, the 
mission has to be in accordance with Swiss foreign and security policy. Second, 
the participating military personnel have to be volunteers, and appropriate 
training has to be accomplished before the mission. And finally, Swiss troops are 
not allowed to perform peace enforcement.234  
Concerning the second meaning of the use of force, the different 
instruments that will be engaged, SIPOL B 2000 declares, on a strategic level, 
foreign policy, the armed forces, civil protection, economic policy, national 
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economic supply, protection of the constitutional order and police, and 
information and communication as the main tools. This has two different 
consequences, one for internal and one for external security. First, the 
instruments are to be used interdependently, and they refer to “security through 
cooperation” in the sense of a more flexible collaboration of all the available 
instruments for internal security. Second, it shows the current rapprochement of 
foreign and security policy. Consequently, the report argues that “the end of the 
Cold War has significantly increased the importance of foreign policy as a factor 
in our security policy.”235 
In sum, during the Cold War, although several elements of a wider 
understanding of security were already implemented, the separation of foreign 
and security policy prevented a clear and comprehensive approach to security 
issues. However, after the end of the bipolar world, ideas of comprehensive 
security have rapidly emerged in Switzerland’s White Papers. 
2. Security Culture  
a. Overview 
Switzerland’s security culture is based mainly on the precepts of 
neutrality and independence. These principles may be traced back in the 
country’s history, being a small state in an environment of bigger and more 
powerful neighbors. Being quiet and not interfering with the belligerence of other 
countries was seen as “the safest policy to maintain security.”236 The fact that 
Switzerland was not attacked in World War II consolidated this attitude. 
Consequently, during the Cold War, the notion of neutrality became even more 
entrenched in the security culture of Switzerland.  
However, neutrality has three different functions in the case of 
Switzerland. First, there is a function regarding security. Neutrality signifies that 
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Switzerland tries to stand generally aloof of international conflicts. Second, but it 
also implies solidarity, especially offering good offices to alleviate conflicts. Third, 
neutrality has also an integration function. This means that neutrality is closely 
associated with Switzerland’s conception and idea of its state.  
It was neutrality’s function regarding security which was most 
strongly maintained in Swiss policy. In a more general approach including foreign 
policy, Switzerland used the flexibility of its neutrality in several ways. First, 
Switzerland also used the special position of a neutral country to offer good 
offices in conflicts. Second, the country joined institutions, such as the European 
Free Trade Association in 1961 and the Council of Europe in 1963. This double 
track attitude was named “neutrality and solidarity.” After the end of the Cold 
War, the general attitude towards neutrality did not change much. Surveys of 
public opinion reveal a high and stable support of neutrality. Between 1993 and 
2006, the preservation of neutrality was always backed by 79 percent to 90 
percent.237 However, one has to take into account that neutrality comprises the 
above mentioned different functions. Neutrality’s functions of solidarity and 
identity enjoy public confidence on a similar level as the general acceptance of 
neutrality. In contrast, neutrality’s function regarding security policy has changed 
since the end of the Cold War and has ranged around 50 percent since 1993.238  
The views of the political elites correspond to the figures of public 
opinion. That is, neutrality as a general value is supported by politicians of almost 
all important parties. However, neutrality in the realm of security policy is 
controversial. Above all, politicians on the conservative side of the political 
spectrum advocate strict neutrality in security issues. The minister for Justice and 
Police, Christoph Blocher, formulated this opinion in 2004 when stating that 
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“neutrality protects the small one because he does not get involved in the power 
struggles of the powerful.”239 On the other side, politicians and parties of the 
center advocate a more pragmatic approach to neutrality in security issues. For 
example, the Free Democratic Party explained in 2007 that Switzerland should 
more strongly follow the notion of “security through cooperation.”240 
b. Changes in Multilateralism and the Use of Force since 
1989 and their Causes 
Until the end of the cold war, Switzerland’s cooperation in security 
issues was limited to institutions where neutrality was guaranteed and where the 
institutions did not make decisions but only recommendations. The CSCE was a 
typical forum in which Switzerland could satisfy these prerequisites. 
Nevertheless, although cooperation was restricted, the country shared core 
values with other western democracies.241 After the events of 1989/1990 and 
especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the immediate threat 
disappeared. Consequently, Switzerland began to incorporate the idea that 
increased multinational cooperation was possible without the abandonment of 
neutrality. Recent referendums about increased cooperation in security issues 
confirm this course.242 During the Cold War, neutrality was not only responsible 
for a “reluctant cooperation in multinational institutions, but also for restraining 
direct engagement abroad.”243 Consequently, the determination of the use of 
force is also dependent upon the concept of neutrality. Still, as in the more 
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flexible part of foreign policy during the Cold War, most of the instruments used 
were of a soft power character. However, the use of military power abroad has 
increased incrementally since 1989.  Thus, one may clearly identify modifications 
in the attitude towards multilateralism and the use of force. The following four 
main adjustments can be explained by the adoption of a more comprehensive 
approach towards security. 
(1) First, Switzerland increasingly deploys armed forces 
abroad in support of peace missions. During the Cold War, Switzerland’s 
contribution to international peace support was limited to the Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in Korea and, through the participation in 
several programs and funds of the UN, to logistical and financial support of UN 
peacekeeping missions. These humble contributions changed after 1989. The 
first deployment was a Medical Unit to Namibia in 1989/1990 and then from 1990 
on, UN military observers in several countries.244 The next contribution was the 
deployment of a Headquarter Support Unit to Bosnia in 1996. In 1999, the 
Federal Council decided to participate with the Kosovo Force (KFOR), based on 
UN Resolution 1244. This mission is still the main example of Switzerland’s 
contribution to international peace support missions. The deployment of Swiss 
officers to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 
2003 and the participation in the European Union Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia are 
the most recent deployments. Currently, 284 Swiss military personnel are 
deployed in peace support operations abroad.245 
Not only has the quantity of the deployments abroad 
increased, but one also observes two changes in the quality of the peace support 
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missions in which Switzerland takes part. First, there is an increased willingness 
to participate in more delicate operations. The advancement from Medical Units 
or UN military observers to Infantry troops in Kosovo or the deployment of 
personnel to Afghanistan mark this trend. Second, in connection with this, since a 
2001 referendum about the Swiss military law, Swiss Contingents abroad can be 
now armed. This was an important step towards a more assertive participation in 
peace support missions. However, Swiss military law also clearly states that 
peace enforcement missions abroad are not possible.246 
Public opinion encouraged this increased deployment of 
troops abroad. In a 2006 survey, 78 percent of respondents advocated missions 
abroad. Public opinion is also more in favor of armed deployments (for self 
protection) versus deployments without arms (47 percent towards 31 percent). 
Possible peace enforcement is only backed by 5 percent.247 The Federal Council 
and the Swiss parliament pursue a policy that reflects this prevailing public 
opinion. In a speech before the referendum about the Swiss military law, and 
therefore about the armament of troops abroad, Defense Minister Samuel 
Schmid confirmed the government’s policy to send military personnel abroad but 
not for peace enforcement.248 
The increased acceptance of a comprehensive approach 
towards security in Switzerland may explain this development regarding the 
increased missions abroad. First, the preparedness for cooperation in security 
issues is one of the main pillars of Switzerland’s comprehensive understanding of 
security after the end of the Cold War. The increased involvement in peace 
support missions is a consequence of this greater acceptance of multilateral 
operations. Moreover, the confluence of security policy and foreign policy, a 
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further important integration that has led to a more comprehensive approach 
towards security, has also contributed to the willingness of supporting 
international missions. Second, societal threats, such as migration, are now 
perceived as a security risk. The events during the wars on the Balkans with 
migration movements throughout all of Europe and the rise of asylum seekers 
confirmed that Switzerland is no longer “an island of security.” 249 The main focus 
of Switzerland’s effort in peace support is consequently the Balkans.  
(2) Second, Switzerland acts mostly in an institutional and 
multilateral way, but still keeps bilateral options outside institutions open. Since 
the end of the Cold War, Switzerland acts in security issues more on a 
multilateral and institutional basis.250 However, the bilateral and also non-
institutionalized approach is still an option for Switzerland. Additionally, SIPOL B 
2000 explains that “Switzerland uses every opportunity for bilateral cooperation 
with friendly states and armed forces.”251 This independent attitude outside of the 
institutional and multilateral framework is still an element of Switzerland’s security 
culture. Sometimes, the bilateral approach is the only legal option because of 
neutrality or other constraints that do not allow for institutional membership and 
multilateral behavior. For example, it is not possible to make contributions to the 
EU Battle Groups, which are permitted to be active throughout the whole 
spectrum of crisis management,252 because peace enforcement is not allowed. 
Current examples of bilateral treaties include those with Germany, France, and 
Italy to safeguard the airspace during the European soccer Championship in 
2008.253 
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Switzerland’s more comprehensive approach to security may 
interestingly offer some explanation for bilateral and non-institutional action. One 
of the main features of comprehensive security in Switzerland is the convergence 
of foreign and security policy. As a result, the stress of an autonomous foreign 
policy (for example with regard to good offices) has also affected the area of 
security policy. This interdependence of foreign and security policy has brought 
some foreign policy restrictions to Switzerland’s security policy. Hence, acting 
bilaterally outside of multilateral institutions is sometimes the only practical 
solution. Furthermore, certain bilateral treaties, in arms control for instance, may 
serve as examples for future agreements in a multilateral framework. In this 
respect, the comprehensive notion of security may also be mentioned as a 
reason for bilateral action. 
(3) Third, Switzerland is increasingly willing to accede 
multilateral security institutions. Before the end of the Cold War, the OSCE was 
the only institution with a security agenda in which Switzerland held membership. 
However, the changes in 1989/1990 with the emergence of new threats and risks 
have led to a modification of Switzerland’s security culture. The two main security 
institutions Switzerland has joined are Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1996 and 
the UN in 2002. However, Switzerland is not a member of the two most important 
security institutions in Europe: NATO and the EU (ESDP). 
Membership in PfP also includes participation in the 
European Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) as well as the Planning and 
Review Process (PARP). Participation in PfP has increased since 1996254 and 
the PfP membership has become normalized within Swiss security policy. 
Nevertheless, the core of Switzerland’s security culture, neutrality, is not affected 
by PfP membership. Switzerland’s membership document for PfP clearly states 
that “all activities [of PfP] in which Switzerland takes part, have to be compatible 
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with its neutrality.”255 Consequently, PfP membership is a good example of 
Switzerland’s cooperative security culture since the end of the Cold War. 
Cooperation is seen as necessary, solidary and accountable for Switzerland’s 
security, yet still limited by the principles of neutrality and independence.  
Only in 2002, after a referendum in the same year, did 
Switzerland become a member of the UN. In 1986, a former referendum for 
accession to the UN did not pass. In other words, the increased willingness after 
the end of the Cold War to cooperate in multilateral institutions facilitated the 
domestic support of UN membership.  
The increased implementation of comprehensive security in 
Switzerland offers possible explanations for the increased participation in security 
institutions. First, the convergence of security policy and foreign policy, one of the 
main parts of Switzerland’s understanding of comprehensive security, facilitated 
the new memberships. Second, both security institutions represent ideas and 
values that are part of Switzerland’s understanding of comprehensive security. 
For example, the UN is committed to the notion of human security, an important 
part of comprehensive security in Switzerland. Moreover, the values behind PfP, 
“stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area, protection and promotion of basic 
and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice and peace through 
democracy”256 correspond with Switzerland’s comprehensive approach to 
security.  
(4) Finally, Switzerland has implemented measures to limit 
the use of force abroad and to guarantee additional democratic accountability for 
the use of armed force abroad. The direct democracy in Switzerland has always 
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given the possibility to demand a poll about security issues. However, the 
quantity of ballots has increased since the end of the Cold War. There were nine 
referendums about security topics, and four of them were related to the use of 
force abroad.257  
In general, the Federal Council is authorized to deploy Swiss 
military personnel.258 However, there are two additional requirements. First, if the 
mission is executed with arms, the Federal Council has first to consult the 
Foreign and the Security Committee of the Parliament. Second, if there are more 
than a hundred military personnel who are sent abroad, or if the mission is longer 
than three weeks, the Parliament has to approve the deployment with a simple 
majority. Besides these domestic prerequisites, a further requirement for the 
deployment of Swiss troops abroad is a UN or an OSCE mandate.  
The implementation of comprehensive security is related to 
the increase in security-related referendums. The question of the use of force 
abroad could only have evolved through this broader understanding of security. 
This understanding goes beyond the notion that the country’s security is limited 
to the defense of its own territory. The convergence of security and foreign policy 
has caused the use of force abroad to receive more attention from the public.  
The additional requirement of a UN or OSCE mandate is 
equally an outcome of the notion of comprehensive security. These institutions 
are the only legitimate agencies which are authorized to marshal the use of force. 
This reliance on collective security also stems from the comprehensive approach 
towards security. 
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In the 1970s, with the conception of "comprehensive defense," 
Switzerland conceptualized a wide range of instruments to allow for the defense 
of the country. However, foreign and security policy were considered two 
separate disciplines and the focus lay on a realist military approach to security. 
The first White Paper after the end of the Cold War in 1990 marked the starting 
point for a more comprehensive approach to security. It was above all about the 
convergence of foreign and security policy and the transition from an 
autonomous to a cooperative security policy. The current White Paper from 1999 
with the title “Security through Cooperation” confirmed this development. 
Switzerland’s security culture is still dominated by the notion of neutrality.  
Yet, neutrality no longer precludes cooperation in security issues with partners in 
or outside of institutions. Therefore, in the area of multilateralism and the use of 
force, one can observe modifications of Switzerland’s security culture. First, 
Switzerland increasingly deploys armed forces abroad in support of peace 
missions. Moreover, over the course of time, Swiss military personnel have been 
deployed on increasingly robust missions. The acceptance of armed missions 
was a decisive step in this advancement. Second, Switzerland primarily acts in 
an institutional and multilateral framework in security issues. However, the 
offering of good offices or the limits imposed by neutrality also require the use of 
bilateral action. Third, Switzerland has become a member of PfP and the UN. In 
both institutions, the country is very active. Finally, questions about the use of 
force abroad are increasingly topics of polls. In addition, although the Federal 
Council is authorized to deploy Swiss military personnel, the parliament gets 
involved in cases of longer or larger contingents abroad. Hence, the overall 
influence of comprehensive security on Swiss security culture has been 
extensive. 
This chapter has examined evidence that a notion of comprehensive 
security has influenced the security cultures of Germany, Great Britain, and 
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Switzerland, taken separately. The next, concluding chapter compares the 
findings of the three case studies and uses these findings to answer the question 








Since the end of the Cold War, the adoption of a broader and wider 
understanding of security has taken place in Germany, Great Britain, and 
Switzerland. Today, although emphasis is placed differently, one may speak of a 
similar comprehensive approach to security in the three examined countries. 
Yet, the development to such a comprehensive approach proceeded in a 
dissimilar progression. Germany, in the 1970s, had already embraced a wider 
definition of security. That definition consisted of two different paths, an economic 
one, and, mainly supported by Social Democrats, a cooperative one. 
Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany 
facilitated the adoption of comprehensive security, both in Germany’s White 
Papers and in its policies. This development occurred swiftly and continued 
steadily.259 In contrast, before the end of the Cold War, Great Britain barely 
incorporated ideas of a wider understanding of security. Furthermore, Britain’s 
rapprochement towards comprehensive security was not propelled by the events 
of 1989\1990. In fact, only in the late 1990s, were the main elements of 
comprehensive security incorporated into Great Britain’s security policies. 
However, this adoption occurred swiftly and in a broad manner. Finally, in 
Switzerland, for a long time, the separation of foreign and security policy 
prevented a clear and comprehensive approach to security issues. Yet, since 
shortly after the demise of the bipolar world, ideas of comprehensive security 
have been absorbed incrementally in White Papers and in Switzerland’s security 
policy.  
This thesis finds that this incorporation of comprehensive security, both in 
White Papers and policies, has had a decisive impact on the security cultures of 
the three countries. Because they followed diverse paths, their security cultures 
have been influenced in different ways and at different moments. However, as 
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there is a reciprocal relationship between the adoption of comprehensive security 
and security culture, a convergence in both areas can be observed. Yet, “new 
security concepts and, in particular, innovative approaches towards the use of 
force, are slow in emerging.”260 Consequently, changes in security culture usually 
occur as incremental adjustments and modifications; extreme turnarounds 
following political shocks are rare.261 Nevertheless, because all the three studied 
countries, Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland, although in separate ways, 
incorporated the idea of a comprehensive approach towards security, a 
convergence of their respective security cultures is clearly visible. 
This thesis follows the method of a structured, focused comparison.262  
Therefore, the case studies concentrated on four questions, all of them in the 
area of multilateralism and the use of force. At this place, a comparison is 
possible. The findings with respect to each question are summarized in the four 
sections that follow, respectively: 
 (1) What are the modifications regarding the use of force abroad? In this 
area one observes distinct modifications of the security culture in all three 
countries since the end of the Cold War. Germany pursues a more assertive 
multilateralism and backs civilian processes abroad with the use of military force. 
This adjustment of Germany’s security culture became visible in the early 1990s 
with the deployment of troops to the Balkans and Somalia. A broad acceptance 
by politicians and the public was also stimulated by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, which approved a revised interpretation of the German 
constitution in 1994.263 Likewise, Great Britain increasingly uses force abroad in 
support of peace missions. The modification of Britain’s security culture mainly 
concerns the change of the purpose of its deployments. Until the end of the Cold 
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War, British military forces were, for the most part, engaged abroad with the 
intention of guarding the country’s own (colonial) interests. Since then, Great 
Britain executes the use of force abroad mostly in a multilateral framework in 
connection with peace operations. Lastly, Switzerland has gradually increased its 
engagement in peace operations from almost none to armed deployments of 
military personnel.   
Hence, there is a significant convergence in the way the three countries 
use force abroad. Initially, there is consensus that peace operations are 
necessary and, amongst other instruments, are a task of armed forces. One can 
argue that there is “now the process of trying to develop a security framework 
that incorporates both civilian and military instruments and [to] apply them in a 
coherent framework to meet commonly agreed security objectives.”264 In other 
words, the lowest common denominator is the participation in peace operations 
beyond a country’s own borders including by military means. Moreover, the 
security cultures of the three examined countries converge on the notion that 
diplomacy not backed by military force may produce a catastrophe.265 
A further convergence, the will to share the burdens beyond financial or 
logistic support, is also obvious. This includes, as a last consequence, also the 
acceptance of casualties. In this respect, Switzerland experienced a great 
modification. From a very limited mission in Korea, as well as logistic and 
financial support for UN operations, Switzerland moved to the deployment of 
mechanized infantry units to Kosovo and military personnel to Afghanistan. 
Likewise, Germany made the step from mainly financial support of peace 
operations to the deployment of large contingents of ground troops. 
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Regarding the goals for the use of force abroad, commonality pertains to 
the attitudes on humanitarian interventions abroad.266 However, views on other 
goals, such as additional political or economic ones are not shared by the three 
countries. Only Great Britain’s security culture, particularly with the adoption of 
the “Blair Doctrine,” allows the prosecution of such objectives. Accordingly, for 
the EU member one can state that  
while humanitarian intervention to prevent material human suffering 
seems to be generally accepted as a legitimate aim of coercive 
action as witnessed in Kosovo and more recently in the Congolese 
Bunia as the first genuine application of ESDP, the promotion of 
democracy, freedom or market economy does not appear as a 
consensus issue among member states.267 
There is a further difference among Germany, Great Britain, and 
Switzerland in respect to the level of force which may be used abroad. In other 
words, it is about the question of whether peace enforcement operations, besides 
operations for peace keeping and peace building, are permissible. In Great 
Britain and Switzerland, the situation is clear. While peace enforcement 
operations are not a problem for Great Britain, in Switzerland, such missions are 
not authorized by the military law in force.268 In contrast, Germany’s attitude 
towards peace enforcement operations is ambiguous. Generally, the use of 
military force abroad is limited to peace keeping and peace building missions. 
The case of Kosovo is perceived as an exception. However, Germany is 
committed to ESDP and therefore also to the “Petersberg tasks,” which include 
peace enforcement. As the German Parliament has to approve all deployments 
of military forces abroad, the question of whether to participate in peace  
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enforcement operations or not will remain a political one. This constitutive 
approval of the Parliament gives all parties a voice in the decision to deploy 
military forces.269 
In sum, in the realm of deployment of military forces abroad, the positions 
of Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland have clearly converged in the last 
twenty years. However, there are still differences in respect to the goals of 
operations abroad and the level of force to accomplish them. The first missions 
under the aegis of ESDP confirm this, at least for Germany and Great Britain. 
Consequently, the near future will most likely see a consolidation of the attained 
commonalities but not an expansion of aims or the level of force. 
(2) What are the adjustments in preferences for multilateral versus 
bilateral approaches in the international system? In all three countries, the 
security culture tends to foster multilateral action in the framework of security 
institutions. However, all states reserve the right to pursue bilateral paths or, in 
the case of Great Britain, to act multilaterally outside of security institutions. The 
reasons for stepping outside a multilateral or institutionalized structure vary from 
country to country. Germany mainly acts bilaterally when the respective issue is 
not dealt with in multilateral institutions. Examples can be found in areas 
regarding environment or energy. Great Britain acts outside of security 
institutions when security institutions, such as the UN, do not come up with a 
desired result. Switzerland, finally, sometimes treads the bilateral path because 
of neutrality restrictions. 
Overall, the security cultures of Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland 
today generally favor multilateral solutions in an institutionalized structure. In this 
respect, one may argue that this demonstrates a convergence of the different 
positions regarding multilateral acting. Yet, there is not complete commonality. 
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Differences can also be detected when it comes to the question of a necessary 
mandate by an international organization for the use of force. Great Britain’s 
“multilateralism a la carte” does not perceive the approval of an international 
security institution as necessary for the use of force. The participation in the war 
in Iraq, without a decision by the UN or another security institution, confirms 
Britain’s attitude in this connection. In contrast, Swiss military law clearly 
demands a UN or an OSCE mandate for the deployment of military personnel. 
Likewise, in Germany, based on the 1994 judgment of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, a “system of mutual collective security” has to authorize the 
use of force. One of the main questions of German constitutional law is whether 
NATO is such an institution of mutual collective security.270 As a result, the 
following statement by Rynning has to be understood as a general rule:  
It is fair to reason that the European use of force will likely resemble 
that of the doctrine of just war: military coercion will take place only 
when mandated by international law (jus ad bellum) and the use of 
force will be severely constrained (jus in bello).271   
One may argue whether the intervention in Kosovo or the participation of 
Great Britain, among several other European countries in the war in Iraq, are 
only exceptions which confirm this general rule. Therefore, it is safer to speak of 
at least a “solidifying consensus on multilateralism and international law.”272  
(3) How has the relationship to multilateral security institutions developed? 
First, in Germany’s security culture, the priorities have shifted slowly from its 
strong commitment to NATO towards ESDP. Likewise, Great Britain has 
approached a close connection to the European security structure; above all with 
the rapprochement to France at the 1998 summit in Saint-Malo. Accordingly, one 
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can observe a “fading attachment to NATO.”273 However, both countries, 
Germany and Great Britain, still maintain a strong relationship to NATO and 
therefore also to the U.S. As a result, convergence among the two EU members, 
Germany and Great Britain, is seen in the sense that both countries advocate the 
EU as strong actor on its own in security issues.274  
In contrast, the modification in Switzerland’s security culture is not related 
to moves between the transatlantic and the European security structure. Rather, 
since the end of the Cold War, Switzerland has approached multilateral security 
institutions, namely the UN and PfP, for the first time at all. Nevertheless, like 
Germany and Great Britain, Switzerland does not take part exclusively in one 
security institution, but tries to be involved in the transatlantic and the European 
pillars. The former is oriented towards PfP and the participation in NATO 
operations, such as Kosovo or Afghanistan; the latter towards participation in 
European operations, for example in Bosnia. 
As a result, there is commonality among the examined security cultures as 
concerns the value of multilateral security institutions. Moreover, all countries are 
not only involved in one multilateral security institution but try to build up a 
network of participation. Meyer summarizes the adjustments in Europe as 
follows:  
Ideas about the nation’s collaboration with other actors in security 
governance have also been affected, motivating the neutrals to 
become more outward-looking, particularly to the EU, while the 
traditionally more Atlanticist nations are gradually pulling away from 
cooperation with the US only to open possibilities of intra-EU 
sharing of defence competences. Convergence thus seems to 
affect all countries, not just the more pacific, neutral or defensive 
strategic cultures, but it does so in different ways.275 
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(4) What are the changes in democratic accountability for the use of force 
abroad? All of these countries have developed ways to involve democratic 
elements in order to revise the decision of governments before they use force 
abroad. In this connection, the general role of parliaments to debate the use of 
force in concrete situations has become a commonality among European States. 
In Germany, the 1994 judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
demanded that a majority of the Parliament support the decision to deploy forces. 
In contrast, the legal situation in Great Britain is different, because there is no law 
or court decision which stipulates such scrutiny. However, in Britain’s political 
reality, the debate in the Parliament, although without direct commitment for the 
government, has become part of its security culture. Finally, in Switzerland, 
Swiss military law regulates that, starting from a fixed strength or length, the 
deployment has to be approved by the Parliament.  
Overall, this thesis demonstrates that the acceptance of the 
comprehensive approach towards security may explain the modifications and 
adjustments in security cultures. Moreover, the thesis reveals that the 
adjustments, based on the notion of comprehensive security, lead to 
convergence in the security cultures among European states. In contrast to other 
factors which influence security cultures, the adoption of comprehensive security 
took place slowly and incrementally. However, because of a reciprocal effect 
from comprehensive security to security culture, the modifications in both areas 
are sustainable. Hence, the adoption of comprehensive security in the examined 
countries has led to a convergence in the security cultures.  
Furthermore, the thesis shows that the convergence of security culture in 
the examined areas of multilateralism and use of force is not a complete one. 
Each security culture, on all levels, is heterogeneous. It is the amount of 
commonality that decides whether there is a common security culture. In this 
respect, the thesis reveals that there are, despite a strong vector of convergence, 
still deeply entrenched elements of national security cultures in the particular 
countries. The debate over the 2003 war in Iraq among European countries is 
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one of the examples which uncovered basic differences in the particular states. 
Nevertheless, since then, there have been encouraging events which prove that 
a shared security culture truly emerges. On the ESDP level, the adoption of the 
ESS in 2003, the successful missions (partly including Switzerland) of ESDP, 
and the counter-terrorism strategy in 2005 are examples. Moreover, although 
Switzerland is not part of the EU or ESDP, respectively, it is obvious that the 
neutral country follows a similar path regarding multilateralism and the use of 
force. 
Finally, this thesis examined only some aspects of multilateralism and the 
use of force. Further essential elements that decide about a shared security 
culture, such as a common threat perception, the will to engage military and 
civilian instruments comprehensively, or the question about the role of military 
forces in police tasks will need to be validated by additional studies. Despite the 
need for further research, this thesis has found clear evidence for the emergence 
of a shared security culture in Europe, based on a more comprehensive 
approach to security. 
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